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Some threats or risk events are predictable with preci-
sion because they are associated with known, recurring 
or likely patterns. Threats linked to geophysical chang-
es are one example. Other risks, such as demographic 
evolution, can only be predicted with a margin of er-
ror. However, those associated with new technologies, 
changing patterns, complex systems or new contextual 
conditions are generally unanticipated and are not widely 
understood, and they have no convincing plan of action 
for mitigation. These are often called “emerging risks”.
It is difficult for any organisation to foresee the future 
and to evaluate the consequences of existing trends and 
drivers of change. This can lead to risks going unnoticed, 
or being ignored or neglected. Emerging risks require a 
different kind of governance than established, familiar 
risks, as many have not yet materialised, or may simply 
fade without materialising.
Investing in emerging risk governance (ERG) serves to 
prevent future damage from new or unfamiliar threats in 
order to protect public interests and to enable organisa-
tions to adapt to changing conditions and possibly even 
recognise new opportunities therein. It also contributes to 
defining a new regulatory environment for emerging risk 
management, for instance in the finance and insurance 
sectors. Emerging risks always demand the involvement 
of top management as they must be given the requisite 
priority; as such, ERG should be considered an integral 
part of the strategic management process and allocated 
the necessary resources.
The project of the International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) to develop Guidelines for Emerging Risk Gov-
ernance stems from previous IRGC work on factors 
contributing to risk emergence (IRGC, 2010a), obsta-
cles to and drivers of emerging risk management (IRGC, 
2011) 1 and workshop discussions with practitioners and 
PREFACE
1 Publications and illustrations are available from the IRGC website at www.irgc.org/risk-governance/emerging-risk.
2 On 6 June 2014, IRGC organised a roundtable discussion on the governance of emerging risks and presented a first draft of the 
guidelines proposed in this paper.
3 Published separately and available on www.irgc.org/publications/core-concepts-of-risk-governance
academics 2. The project aims to provide guidance for 
practitioners in business and the public sector, to help 
them improve their own capabilities to cope with emerg-
ing threats and surprises. Although there are differences 
between public- and private-sector organisations, there 
are also similarities, such as short-term imperatives re-
lated to either electoral constraints in governments or 
immediate financial returns and expectations in business, 
reputational issues, and general resource constraints.
IRGC intends neither to build a theory of ERG nor to focus 
on particular emerging risks. Rather, it seeks to provide 
a road map or checklist that organisations can adapt 
to their particular needs and objectives. The purpose of 
the guidelines, therefore, is to:
• Provide guidance for emerging risk anticipation and 
response
• Categorise emerging risk and place it in a response 
framework
• Detect and analyse relevant signs of ongoing or future 
dynamics that could change the risk portfolio of a given 
organisation
• Induce the disappearance of an emerging risk, its 
“decommission” from the watch list of emerging 
threats, or to prompt its move into the portfolio of 
routinely manageable risks.
This report and its Appendices 3 describe the guidelines, 
provide underlying scientific evidence and:
• Give information about other frameworks for emerging 
risk management
• Present an introduction to scenario and narrative 
development
• Provide insights into concepts and methods from 
fields other than risk management that can be useful 
to address uncertainty and emerging risk issues.
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The IRGC Guidelines for Emerging Risk Governance de-
scribe key steps and associated methodologies for early 
identification and management of emerging risks. 
The process proposed in this report covers an overarch-
ing, flexible and adaptable set of guidelines designed to 
deal with complex, evolving and uncertain environments. 
It can help organisations to:
• Step 1:  Make sense of the present & explore the future
• Step 2:  Develop scenarios based on narratives and 
models
• Step 3:  Generate risk management options  
& formulate strategy
• Step 4:  Implement strategy
• Step 5:  Review risk development and decisions
At the beginning of the risk emergence process, the 
aim is to detect and analyse (weak) signals pertaining 
to ongoing and future dynamics that may change an or-
ganisation’s risk portfolio, and evaluate whether risks to 
the organisation may materialise and with what potential 
impact. Emerging risk managers aim to navigate the un-
certainties involved in the risk’s development until more 
knowledge is collected and analysed. Then either the risk 
becomes familiar and can be steered into a portfolio of 
routinely manageable risks, or it is evaluated as tolerable, 
or it is steered into disappearance. It may be the case, 
for example, that the social construction and perception 
of an emerging risk does not coincide with its scientific 
assessment.
Strategies for managing emerging risks thus differ from 
those for managing familiar risks. IRGC proposes six 
management options, which can be combined for a more 
effective outcome:
1. Acting on the factors that contribute to risk 
emergence or amplification
2. Developing precautionary approaches
3.  Reducing vulnerability
4. Modifying the organisation’s risk appetite in line 
with a new risk
5. Using “conventional” risk governance instruments 
to manage familiar risks
6. Doing nothing
As governing emerging risks is at the intersection of var-
ious disciplines and theoretical frameworks, IRGC has 
integrated expertise from various fields in this project, 
including risk management, futures studies, innovation 
management, dynamic capabilities and strategic deci-
sion-making.
Particular emphasis is put on the need for an emerging 
risk conductor, whose role is to coordinate and lead the 
internal and external stakeholders involved in the as-
sessment, management and communication of emerging 
issues. Equally important is that emerging risk govern-
ance be set as a strategic priority, with involvement from 
top management.
SUMMARY
This report is accompanied by Appendices, published separately, in 
which readers can find further conceptual insights and recommen-
dations.
1. Review of existing emerging risk governance frameworks
1.1 Framework of the European Union Agency for Network  
and Information Security (ENISA)
1.2 Framework of the European Food Safety Authority
1.3 The Swiss Re SONAR system
1.4 CEN workshop agreement on managing emerging 
technology-related risks (DIN CWA 16649)
1.5 Identifying and managing emerging risks involved  
in the use of chemicals – the Dutch framework
2. Theoretical foundations and additional comments
2.1 Cultural theory of risk 
2.2 Proactive thinking in management: dynamic capabilities  
in strategic and innovation management
2.3 The use of signals and early warnings in technology 
management 
2.4 Foresight and scenario development
2.5 Robust decision-making
2.6 Strategy implementation
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1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Definition of emerging risks
IRGC defines emerging risks as new risks or familiar risks that become ap-
parent in new or unfamiliar conditions. This definition suggests that managers 
need to focus on the early detection and analysis of emerging risks’ triggers, 
including the development of familiar risks into new threats.
IRGC’s initiative on emerging risks does not aim to establish conceptual or 
theoretical delineations. It acknowledges that definitions must be adapted 
to specific contexts. Scholars are working to establish a common definition, 
including a proposal by Roger Flage and Terje Aven (2015) to emphasise 
that “knowledge becomes the key concept for both emerging risk and black 
swan type of events” and thus that the concept of emerging risk is relative, 
not absolute.
Types of emerging risks
In the concept note “Emerging Risks: Sources, Drivers and Governance 
Issues” (IRGC, 2010b), IRGC listed various categories of risks according to 
their source: human, natural or causal interactions. Emerging risks can thus 
result from trends or events in these fields, which alone or in combination 
have the intrinsic potential to induce risk.
However, for the specific purpose of providing guidelines on how to manage 
emerging risks, IRGC focuses on risks resulting from new or future threats, 
or having an impact on new or future exposures and vulnerabilities. In these 
cases, the focus is on the low level of knowledge of the potential losses as 
well as the probability distribution of their occurrence. In any case, stake-
holders with different interests or viewpoints may contest this knowledge.
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IRGC suggests emerging risk categorisation according to 
three types:
A. High uncertainty and a lack of knowledge about po-
tential impacts and interactions with risk-absorbing 
systems: These risks have uncertain impacts, with uncer-
tainty resulting from new products, services or behaviours 
(owing to social dynamics, including advances in science 
and technological innovation). The dominant feature of this 
type of emerging risk is the lack of scientific knowledge 
and experience regarding the possible consequences, 
especially in interaction with already existing technolo-
gies and practices. Governance activities include deciding 
whether to authorise certain products, services, beha- 
viours or technologies, and implementing appropriate risk 
management measures to avoid or mitigate potential ad-
verse consequences. Current examples include products 
and processes in nanotechnology or synthetic biology.
B. Increasing complexity, emerging interactions and 
systemic dependencies that can lead to non-linear 
impacts and surprises: Risks with systemic impacts stem 
from systems with multiple interactions and adaptive be-
haviours. The defining feature of this type of emerging risk 
is the loss of safety margins or a lack of knowledge about 
the way familiar risks are connected to other risks in an 
interdependent and complex environment. In the case 
of technological systems, the main issue is not the risk 
inherent in the technologies, but its interaction with other 
types of risk. Examples of complex interconnected sys-
tems are numerous in the fields of energy, transportation, 
communications and information technology.
C. Changes in context (for example social and behavioural 
trends, organisational settings, regulations, natural 
environments) that may alter the nature, probability and 
magnitude of expected impacts: New and unexpected 
risks can emerge from established technologies, products 
or processes in evolving contexts. The main issue in this 
type of emerging risk is that its potential impact on fami- 
liar processes, products or technologies (in terms of both 
probability and magnitude) challenges seemingly well- 
established governance practices. Changes in context 
or organisational settings include ageing infrastructures, 
complacency and/or overconfidence in the ability to deal 
with unexpected events. The commercial aviation industry 
provides a useful example of the importance of effectively 
managing this type of risk.
4 Although low-probability, high-consequence risks are not excluded, clearly this categorisation is not specifically identified to anti- 
cipate them or the extreme case of “unknown unknowns”.
5 Some of the examples provided in this report may be “past” emerging risks. They have been chosen to provide evidence of how 
emerging risks were managed in the past, including certain assessment or management options, that could be relevant for emerging 
risks in general. Examples provide lessons from hindsight or from experience.
Differences between emerging and familiar risks
It is helpful to compare emerging risks with risks considered “familiar” (known 
risks evolving in familiar conditions, also sometimes called regular, routine, 
known or conventional risks). The concept of familiarity assumes the exist-
ence of recognisable patterns and management regimes that are relatively 
stable and have proven to be effective if implemented according to certain 
rules. By contrast, emerging risks are characterised mainly by uncertainty 
regarding their potential consequences and/or probabilities of occur-
rence. This can be due to a lack of knowledge about causal or functional 
relationships between new risk sources and their environment or to the 
insufficient application of available knowledge to the case in question.
The notion of familiarity emphasises that a familiar risk is familiar to a risk 
manager who, therefore, knows how to manage it. A risk may be familiar to 
certain risk managers but not to others who may thus not be aware of how 
to manage it.
Although this report frames emerging risks as a distinct phenomenon, in 
reality no sharp distinction exists between emerging and familiar risks, with 
Box 1: Three types of emerging risk 4 5 
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instead a continuum where emerging risks progressively acquire some of the 
features of familiar, known, risks. Through information gathering and effective 
management, emerging risks can become familiar risks over time.
People and organisations exposed to emerging risk must be prepared to deal 
with environments characterised by instability and high uncertainty of future 
impacts, with various sets of interactions and cascading effects. It is difficult 
to imagine what has never happened before; the context is often difficult to 
describe and frame. The future development of cyberspace, for example, 
with trends such as cloud computing, big data or the Internet of Things is, 
at least today, beyond most people’s imagination.
In emerging risk management, what matters most to an organisation is its 
potential exposure. At the early stages of risk assessment, focusing on 
likelihood or impact can be misleading, since the underlying uncertainty 
makes conventional approaches to projecting loss size, relative frequencies, 
probability distributions or severity of consequences ineffective. To analyse 
potential impact, however, the necessary “filtering process” requires the 
assumption of some form of likelihood and relevance to the organisation. 
Attempts to assess emerging risks with technical or scientific instruments 
may prove futile as the scientific understanding of these risks can change 
rapidly. Therefore, adaptability and flexibility are crucial.
1.2 Emerging risk governance
Emerging risk governance begins with the process of regularly revising the 
organisation’s portfolio of risks and opportunities. This involves scanning 
the environment and analysing the many signals and trends produced by 
early-warning systems.
An organisation’s risk portfolio (or “risk profile”, i.e. the description of the sets 
of risks that may affect it) is most often revised in three cases:
• After an accident or a “near miss” 6 (correctly analysed and treated) 
• After an observed change in the organisation’s environment (a new 
regulation, technology, entrant in the market, social or economic trend, 
climatic conditions, etc.)
• Through a forward-looking exercise to analyse existing and possible future 
trends, practices, drivers and conditions of change
In the first two cases, the organisation is reactive. When a dramatic accident 
or change cannot otherwise be averted, reactive approaches may be rele-
vant (and may indeed be the only possible approach), although they have 
limitations (see Box 2).
This report focuses on the third case. It promotes a proactive strategy 
and suggests a process to implement it in a systematic and reflective way.
6 The concept of “near miss” implies that a given accident sequence was stopped before adverse consequences occurred. This 
concept originated in the aviation industry, to analyse and draw lessons from events that could have led to accidents.
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The collapse of Kodak has become a textbook example of an 
organisation failing to adopt timely and appropriate strategies 
in the face of turbulent environments. From the position of 
worldwide market leader in film photography with a well- 
recognised research and innovation tradition in the 1980s, 
to bankruptcy in 2012, the story of Kodak exemplifies the 
threat posed by the lack of a proactive approach in strategic 
decision-making. While the development of digital techno- 
logy is often cited as the juncture that Kodak missed, it is 
interesting to note that Kodak’s engineers had developed 
digital technology as early as the 1970s. Yet the organisation 
was reluctant to use the technology (as well as several other 
innovations) for new products and markets. The company was 
misled by its comfortable position and large profit margins 
in the film market, a situation that did not force its managers 
to take the risk of investing in new products, despite various 
alerts internally. When Kodak eventually turned to digital pho-
tography, it was too late. New competitors already occupied 
the bulk of the market.
Proactive emerging risk governance
Proactive governance of emerging risks aims to enhance anticipation and 
forward-looking capabilities. Projecting managers into their possible future 
operating context helps highlight decision opportunities and provides them 
with additional lead time to prevent risks from emerging or to manage their 
consequences.
At this point, two important questions must be asked:
• As conventional risk management approaches imply a certain form of 
prediction (typically with anticipatory assessments to prevent the risk 
from materialising), what additional capabilities for “looking forward” does 
proactive ERG contribute? 
• As looking to the future involves uncertainties (which increase with the 
passage of time), emerging risk management shares commonalities with 
uncertainty management. How can uncertainties related to the future be 
dealt with effectively?
Preliminary responses are provided by a typology of the various levels of 
uncertainty that a manager can face (see Figure 1).
Anticipatory approaches used in risk management allow decision- 
makers to deal with the first two levels of uncertainty. Most commonly, 
risk assessment addresses the combinations of events described at levels 
1 and 2 that may lead to adverse consequences. Each combination has its 
own probability distribution, based on statistical calculations derived from 
past distributions or on Bayesian assessments of experts’ strength of belief, 
and an evaluation of the adverse consequences. Risk assessment is thus 
the outcome of anticipatory approaches involving knowledge of system 
components and associated dynamics on the one hand, and the ability to 
imagine adverse combinations of those dynamics on the other.
Yet even if perfect knowledge of these distributions were possible and em-
pirically validated probabilities could be assigned to each alternative at each 
junction (see level 2), the aggregate of all probabilities over several junctions 
Box 2: Kodak, the lack of a proactive approach proves fatal
Source: Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011
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Figure 1: A typology of uncertainties
(Source: Walker, Marchau & Swanson, 
2010)
would still result in low probabilities even for the most probable route through 
the event tree diagram. One could imagine five junctions with one resulting 
alternative of 0.8 probability at each intersection. The last route in this com-
bination would have only a probability of 0.328 (0.8 x 0.8 x 0.8 x 0.8 x 0.8), 
meaning there is a 0.672 chance that the most probable outcome will not 
occur. This shows the limitations of this type of analysis even when the level 
of confidence about the probability distribution is high.
Anticipatory practices used in risk 
management are limited by the 
set of events that can be studied 
(see for example the “Cause Conse-
quence” diagram in Figure 2). Two 
types of boundaries can be observed. 
The first boundary is temporal and 
occurs when only events considered 
plausible today and characterised by 
a probability distribution are studied. 
No or very little consideration is giv-
en to projections of how the system 
components may evolve or what the 
impact of the resulting developments 
may be. The second type of bound-
ary is socially constructed. It results 
from the fact that practitioners incre-
mentally define the extent to which 
their imagination should be limited, 
as well as what should and should 
not be taken into account in defining combinations of events. For instance, 
plane crashes are systematically considered as possible events in the risk 
assessments of nuclear power plants (US NRC, 2007), but are generally not 
taken into account in those of non-nuclear infrastructure.
(Source: Author)
Figure 2: Anticipation in classic risk 
assessment: The bow-tie approach
Hazardous event
(release of hazard)
e.g. maloperation
e.g. overpressure
e.g. ESD 
bypassed e.g. detector failure
e.g. deluge failure
e.g. explosion
CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM (BOW TIE)
HAZARD
(e.g. gas
under
pressure)
EVENT TREE
(Escalation Scenarios)   
FAULT TREE
(Causes)
e.g. loss
of gas con-
tainment
sequence of faults and causes
leading to a hazardous event
sequence of events and failures leading 
to the escalation of a hazardous event
CONSE-
QUENCES
In industrial risk assessment, “bow ties” represent various possible combinations of 
events leading to the hazardous incident (a toxic release, explosion, etc.). Each path 
from one extreme of the bow tie to the other is a possible risk sequence characte-
rised by a distribution of probabilities and an evaluation of consequences.
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Emerging risk management, in its proactive form, must go beyond these 
limitations. It must help decision-makers deal with deeper levels of uncer-
tainty (levels 3 and 4 depicted in Figure 1), where no reliable distribution of 
probabilities is available and only incipient trends of possible future evolu-
tions exist, suggesting that various futures may affect the organisation 7 (see 
Appendix 2.2).
Scenario planning and strategic foresight
To deal with high levels of uncertainty and explore the future, it is necessary 
to go beyond conventional anticipatory approaches on forecasting that 
rely on past data to predict the future (Anderson, 1997). It is also necessary 
to go beyond the usual Bayesian approach of eliciting and calibrating expert 
judgments. Emerging risks often arise from complex and interrelated 
systems, the dynamics of which are potentially subject to positive feedback, 
non-linear evolutions and stochastic behaviour. Relying exclusively on experi-
ence or expert judgments to describe the future may thus lead to disillusions. 
The mutation of viruses, the development of antimicrobial resistance, financial 
crashes or the potential collapse of large electricity networks are examples 
of entire systems going through sudden and new, unanticipated and uncon-
trolled shifts that to a large extent remain unexplained.
The type of anticipation required for emerging risks in complex systems and 
uncertain environments includes combining expertise on complex dynamics 
and expanding one’s imagination beyond the limits of experience (described 
as “disciplined imagination”). This involves developing scenarios of possi-
ble futures and exploiting them for decision-making even if no probability 
distributions are available (van Notten, 2006; Healey & Hodgkinson, 2008; 
Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013).
Governing emerging risks at strategic levels, 
in all phases of decision-making
Like other disciplines such as dynamic capabilities or innovation management 
(see Appendix 2.2), the governance of emerging risks needs to be performed 
at strategic levels of decision-making in order to cope with both underlying 
complexity and uncertainty, and to trigger the required deployment and 
implementation dynamics at all levels of an organisation.
Strategic decision-making involves a set of competences that align well 
with the challenges of emerging risk governance and, in general, a proactive 
approach to long-term thinking and acting. The most common features of 
strategic decision-making include a long-term view (JI, 2010), the configu-
ration or reconfiguration of resources and competences within a changing 
7 The Dutch Environmental Assessment Agency proposes to emphasise the important difference between “statistical uncertainty” 
and “scenario uncertainty” (as well as “recognised ignorance”) in order to improve the assessment of uncertainty. The evaluation of 
uncertainty can be further refined by paying specific attention to framing the problem and by consulting stakeholders (PBL Neth-
erlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2013). In line with the terminology used in the IRGC white paper on risk governance 
(IRGC, 2005), the sources of uncertainty are target variability, systematic and random error in modelling, indeterminacy or genuine 
stochastic effects, system boundaries, and ignorance or non-knowledge
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environment (Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 2008), as well as the need to 
deal with issues that are ill-structured, non-routine (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, 
& Theoret, 1976) and complex (Elbanna, 2006).
Implementing strategic decisions about emerging risks may imply large cul-
tural, technical and organisational shifts that will have an impact on the 
entire organisation. Such decisions need to be taken at the organisational 
levels where objectives, performance criteria and individual practices can 
be aligned, questioned and revised if some of them prove to be inappro- 
priate. The ability of strategic decisions to engage substantial resources, set 
precedents and create decision waves at lower levels (Dean Jr. & Sharfman, 
1993) defines the necessary conditions for successfully implementing the 
outcome of ERG processes.
ERG in organisations must thus not be a stand-alone exercise. Many of the 
risk management practices are generic, and addressing emerging risks must 
be embedded within a core corporate or organisational process.
1.3. The emerging risk “conductor”
Complex organisations should organise their response to emerging risks in a 
structured manner. Developing and deploying a systematic process for ERG 
to support strategic decision-making require coordinating various kinds of 
technical expertise, challenging existing organisational routines and balancing 
possibly conflicting individual stakeholder objectives within and external to 
the organisation. Emerging risk governance hence requires leadership: it 
needs a “conductor”.
Just as the conductor of an orchestra shapes the overall sound and tempo 
of the musicians’ performance, the role of the emerging risk conductor is to 
ensure the effective implementation of the guidelines.
The conductor and team must have the mission and resources to lead the 
process and to:
• Facilitate interactions between the participants, who may have different 
objectives and expertise. Special attention should be given to ensure that 
the needs for support and decision-makers’ preferences are adequately 
addressed and considered before the emerging risk management options 
are selected.
• Validate technical frameworks and approaches adopted during the 
process, by considering their scientific soundness and appropriateness 
to the organisation’s resources and needs.
• Monitor performances to demonstrate their relevance for the organisation 
and, if required, identify and correct weaknesses. Monitoring the 
performance of outcomes is challenging, so focusing on the performance 
and robustness of the process may be useful, rather than being fixated 
on outcomes.
14 //  IRGC Guidelines for Emerging Risk Governance
• Promote behaviours and attitudes in line with the cultural challenge 
raised by emerging risk governance. Ensuring transparency, encouraging 
divergent views, avoiding simplistic visions and eliciting the consideration 
of extreme and highly unlikely events are examples of what is required to 
overcome cognitive bias (possible deviation from a standard of rationality) 
and organisational opposition.
• Communicate internally and externally to increase awareness of and 
concern for emerging risks, create a favourable climate for ERG, explain 
and clarify decisions, and answer questions.
• Report on the potential impact of emerging risks on various sectors and 
their management.
• Periodically review whether the adopted risk management framework 
and strategy options still conform with the organisation’s internal and 
external context.
The concept of a “risk owner” who, in some organisations, is assigned re-
sponsibility for the effective management of a risk is different from the concept 
of the emerging risk conductor. The conductor is in charge of coordinating 
and facilitating the emerging risk governance process. The responsibility and 
accountability for making the organisation responsive to and literate about 
risk management is the task of the risk owner, if this function exists in the 
organisation.
The role and position of the conductor and team may vary depending on 
the organisation’s structure (it could be the chief risk officer), or the type of 
organisation and regulatory framework. In some cases, the organisation has a 
legal mandate to address and deal with emerging risks. This, for example, is 
the case at the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) or the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). In other instances, 
the organisation itself has determined that internal decision-makers need 
insights regarding emerging risks. Most insurance companies have emerging 
risk units that provide operational business units with validated information 
on new issues representing opportunities and risks for the insurance market. 
Whether ERG is performed within or outside a legal mandate, the internal 
process will be scrutinised for its capacity to provide effective and relevant 
outputs and benefits for the organisation. This can be challenging, as avoided 
risks are often “invisible” and avoided losses cannot be easily evaluated.
Some governments have a chief scientific adviser (CSA) who provides scienti- 
fic advice to all departments. He/she makes suggestions, organises, facili-
tates and provides overall advice on the use of evidence-based information 
for policymaking and regulations. The CSA is not in charge of handling all 
scientific issues, but can help to mediate between science, stakeholders and 
politicians, especially in situations of uncertainty and ambiguity. This role is 
similar to the emerging risk conductor.
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2.
IRGC GUIDELINES 
FOR EMERGING RISK 
GOVERNANCE
Defining an appropriate framework and a model process is of critical impor-
tance for effective risk governance, whether in the public or private sector. The 
guidelines proposed by IRGC provide an overarching framework to support 
senior managers in addressing emerging risks. They help to organise how 
information and evidence are collected, analysed and combined to design 
strategies for ERG.
The guidelines are to be further developed and adapted to each organisa-
tion, with the assistance of an emerging risk conductor. They rely on strong 
leadership and the willingness to challenge organisational routines and focus 
on mid- and long-term issues. The process is adaptable to organisational 
specificities.
At a broad strategic level, implementing these guidelines should result in 
four distinct key capabilities:
• Enhancing proactive thinking to identify future threats and opportunities
• Evaluating the organisation’s willingness to bear or to avoid risk (risk 
appetite) for the definition of future strategies
• Prioritising investments in certain key emerging issues according to their 
potential impact
• Fostering internal communication and building a forward-looking culture 
to benefit the whole organisation
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Objectives of the guidelines
The IRGC guidelines for ERG:
• Provide guidance to organisations in anticipating and responding to 
emerging risks
Risk emergence can be a long process that can create opportunities for 
early and effective interventions. If, for example, an industrial process 
involves a new material with potential yet unproven risks, the organisation 
can take early management measures, such as substituting the material 
with a more benign one or monitoring the likely impact over an extended 
period, before releasing the material into the environment.
• Provide transparent and enforceable criteria for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the ERG process, underlining, inter alia, the relevance 
and usefulness of foresight approaches and the legitimacy of decisions
Reflexivity, defined as the process of evaluating the relevance and quality 
of organisational processes, is a key issue in management. It implies ans- 
wering two key questions: Do we need to do what we are doing? If yes, are 
we doing it right? Exploring these questions provides organisations with 
the capacity for continuous improvement as well as the ability to justify 
decisions already made. No guidelines for ERG can escape this rationality, 
as it may result in difficult decisions, like investing money today to avoid a 
hypothetical loss in the future. The more difficult the decision, the stronger 
the requirement for legitimacy. Demonstrating legitimacy is important for 
ERG to ensure that it will be taken into account when decisions are made. 
As reflexivity in ERG can hardly be performed through the direct evaluation 
of outputs that may only be revealed after a long latency period, IRGC 
suggests focusing on procedural evaluations through a set of evaluation 
criteria for each of the steps described in the guidelines.
• Embed the emerging risk management process as a routine within 
the organisation, drawing from existing processes
Drastic events, or even catastrophes, often occur because early-warning 
signals were ignored. In addition to the Kodak example described in Box 2, 
the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 or the Challenger Shuttle accident 8 in 
1986 are relevant examples. Generally, organisations do not often try to 
anticipate emerging risks, even in the field of technology (Petersen, 2008). 
It is therefore important to tightly link foresight capabilities to strategic 
decision-making structures. This requires the ERG process to become a 
part of the organisation’s routine.
IRGC stresses the relevance of establishing links in an organisation between 
risk managers and those in charge of strategic planning, innovation manage- 
ment and other management functions. These links need to be made at the 
conceptual level – the focus of this report – as well as at the practical level, 
as illustrated in case studies that IRGC is developing as a complement to 
this report.
8 Also see Hodgkinson & Starbuck, 2008.
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The IRGC guidelines for ERG (as shown in Figure 3 below) comprise five 
consecutive and interlinked steps. The following sections give a detailed 
description of each step, its objectives, key participants and expected out-
comes.
Figure 3: IRGC Emerging Risk 
Governance Guidelines
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STEP 1
MAKE SENSE OF THE PRESENT 
& EXPLORE THE FUTURE
REQUIRED ACTIONS
• Detect and explore current and possible future 
evolutions that may change the organisation’s 
environment.
• Analyse these changes according to their ability to 
represent a threat and/or an opportunity in the short 
and medium term.
• Filter and prioritise the set of detected threats 
and opportunities to identify those that require 
further attention in Step 2, and those that can be 
decommissioned.
• Regularly update the selection of risks and opportunities 
when new information becomes available.
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
• List of selected threats and opportunities that is 
regularly updated and that requires further analysis 
because of potential positive or negative, immediate 
or long-term, impact on the organisation.
• Description of the context in which these threats and 
opportunities may develop.
• Identification of the necessary or sufficient conditions 
for the risk or opportunity to materialise.
• List of threats and opportunities that are irrelevant 
to the organisation’s objectives given information 
available at the time.
KEY PARTICIPANTS      & RESPONSIBILITIES
Emerging risk conductor ............. defines approaches and facilitates continuous interactions among experts  
and between experts and decision-makers.
Experts and analysts .................... detect signals, perform analyses and suggest necessary characterisation.
Senior decision-makers ............... validate Step 1 outputs and decide which issues will be further investigated  
and what resources will be allocated to the process.
• Diversity of information
• Scientific soundness of data collection, analysis and prioritisation
• Data reliability and consistency
• Compatibility with existing and past or familiar threats
KEY  
SUCCESS  
FACTORS
KEY OBJECTIVE: PROVIDE EARLY WARNING
Prerequisite: Establish a process to continuously screen the organisation’s internal and external environment, to 
provide reliable and updated inputs to the ERG process.
Step 1 provides early warning by identifying:
• Potential threats or opportunities to relevant assets and processes.
• Contributing factors that create fertile ground for risks and opportunities to develop (emerge, amplify or 
attenuate).
It aims to make sense of signals that might shape the future.
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What to do and how
Challenged by a variety of sources and combinations of diverse risks and 
opportunities, organisations need rigorous, replicable and systematic tools for 
scanning and understanding their internal and external environment. At the 
first step of the process, the conductor will establish processes for identifying 
and describing possible futures in which risks and opportunities may develop.
Detection – data and information collection
At the early stages of emerging risk/opportunity development, available 
information is likely to be poor, highly uncertain and subject to divergent inter-
pretations. Despite these characteristics, this type of information, described 
as weak signals, may serve the purpose of avoiding strategic surprises and 
preparing to deal with turbulent environments. Detecting and interpreting 
weak signals have become key objectives of the weak signals theory and, 
to a larger extent, of futures studies (Rossel, 2009). Environmental or horizon 
scanning is defined as a systemic process of strategic learning about organi-
sations’ circumstances (Spies, 1991) that aims to identify new developments 
that can challenge past assumptions or provide a new perspective on future 
threats and opportunities (Gordon & Glenn, 1994). Horizon-scanning activities 
can be fully exploratory or issue centred (Amanatidou, et al., 2012).
There are various ways to engage in detection practices and approaches:
• In some cases, the organisation does not have the internal capacity to 
develop its own detection and analysis expertise. In this case, it can rely 
on predefined lists of emerging risks and opportunities described by 
national and/or international entities: foresight agencies, consulting firms, 
professional associations, international organisations, etc.
• In other cases, the organisation may be willing to invest resources in 
horizon-scanning activities and early-warning systems to improve its own 
ability to identify weak signals and early warnings indicating possible shifts.
Early-warning systems can be developed in complementary ways:
• Expert panels may provide regular inputs on incipient or forthcoming 
changes. These can be collected through questionnaires, essays or 
moderated workshops.
• Due to the development of large databases, social media and artificial 
intelligence, it is becoming increasingly affordable and effective to scan 
and analyse large amounts of various types of information, ranging 
from scientific essays and papers to public perceptions and opinions 
(semantic data mining). Keyword tracking, trend evolutions or the number 
of significant occurrences of an event are examples of valuable information 
that automatic scanning can capture.
• Environmental scanning can also be performed by tracking the existence 
of contributing factors to risk emergence as described by IRGC (2010a) 
(see Box 3). Examples are the analysis of information asymmetries, the 
identification of scientific unknowns or the identification and analysis of 
perverse incentives in the organisation’s context.
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Factor 1: Scientific unknowns
Scientific unknowns, whether tractable or intractable, con-
tribute to risks being unanticipated, unnoticed and over- or 
underestimated.
Factor 2: Loss of safety margins
The level of connectivity in many of today’s social and 
technical systems is greater than in the past and the in-
terconnections are increasing. The pace at which these 
systems operate is intensifying and many are operating 
under high levels of stress. This can lead to tight coupling of 
components within systems and to a loss of safety margins.
Factor 3: Positive feedback
Systems exhibiting positive feedback react by amplifying a 
change or perturbation that affects them. Positive feedback 
tends to be destabilising and can thus amplify the likelihood 
or consequences of an emerging risk.
Factor 4: Varying susceptibilities to risks
The consequences of an emerging risk may be different 
from one population to another. Geography, genetics, expe-
rience and wealth are just some of the possible contextual 
differences that create varying susceptibilities to risks.
Factor 5: Conflicts of interest, values and science
Public debates about emerging risks seldom show a clear 
separation between science, values and interests. This 
results in conflicts that create fertile ground for risks to 
emerge or amplify.
Factor 6: Social dynamics
Social change can lead to social harm. In other circum-
stances, it can attenuate potential harm. It is therefore 
important for risk managers to identify, analyse and 
understand changing social dynamics.
Factor 7: Technological advances
Risk may emerge when technological change is not ac-
companied by appropriate prior scientific investigation or 
post-release surveillance of the resulting public health, eco-
nomic, ecological and societal impacts. Risks are further 
exacerbated when economic, policy or regulatory frame-
works are insufficient. Yet technological innovation may 
be unduly delayed if such frameworks are overly stringent.
Factor 8: Temporal complications
A risk may emerge or be amplified if its time course makes 
detection difficult or if the time course does not align with 
the time horizons of concern to analysts, managers and 
policymakers.
Factor 9: Communication
Risks may be complicated or amplified by untimely, in-
complete, misleading or absent communication. Effective 
communication that is open and frank can help to build 
trust. In many cases, such communication can lead to 
better anticipating and managing emerging risk.
Factor 10: Information asymmetries
Information asymmetries occur when some stakeholders 
hold back key information about a risk that is not available 
to others. These asymmetries may be created intentionally 
or accidentally. In some cases, the maintenance of asym-
metries can reduce risks but, in other cases, it can be the 
source of risk or amplify a risk by creating mistrust and 
fostering non-co-operative behaviours.
Factor 11: Perverse incentives
Perverse incentives are those that induce counterproduc-
tive or undesirable behaviours, which lead to negative, 
unintended consequences. Such incentives may lead to 
the emergence of risks, either by fostering overly risk-prone 
behaviours or by discouraging risk prevention efforts.
Factor 12: Malicious motives and acts
Malicious motives give rise to emerging risks and therefore 
practitioners need to consider intentional as well as uninten-
tional causes of risks. Malicious motives and acts are not 
new but, in a globalised world with highly interconnected 
infrastructures, their effects can have a much broader im-
pact than in the past.
Box 3: Contributing factors to risk emergence
Source: IRGC, 2010a
Exploration 
Organisations can decide to invest and engage in exploratory exercises 
to imagine and describe the future context in which identified opportunities 
and threats may arise and evolve. These exercises to sketch out possible 
futures require building upon a very large set of expertise and imaginative 
capabilities. Under the auspices of Pierre Wack (1985a; 1985b), Shell has 
been developing exploratory scenarios (Ramirez et al., 2011) for more than 
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30 years. Although this approach requires extensive resources, it provides a 
broad and comprehensive vision of the new threats and opportunities that 
may unfold in the future. In addition, it contributes to the development of an 
organisation’s internal capacity to make sense of change and events. This 
capacity will also be useful at a later stage of the process (see Steps 3 and 
4), for decision and strategy implementation.
The concept of “disciplined imagination”, developed to describe the process 
of theory construction in organisational studies (Weick, 1989; Cornelissen, 
2006), can also be applied to the exploration of future organisational contexts 
from which risks may emerge.
Analysis – making sense of information
The signals identified through horizon scanning (including early-warning 
systems) and the exploration of the future need to be further analysed and 
transformed into knowledge. In many cases, the possible consequences of 
signals are not easy to understand. In such cases, the process of assigning 
meaning to the outcome of scanning and exploratory exercises is usually 
described as sense-making (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).
Analysis and sense-making include the following aspects:
• Link the threat/opportunity to what is valuable for the organisation
• Describe the mechanisms and rationality underlying the emergence of a 
threat or drivers in changes to risk and opportunity profiles
• List the factors that may contribute to risk emergence or attenuation/
disappearance in the future
• Describe early signals of change detected in the environment, such as 
information in press releases, research papers or a rise in stakeholders’ 
concerns
• Detail the pros and cons of further analysing the threat/opportunity in the 
next steps of the guidelines
Filtering and selecting potential threats  
that require attention
As the set of threats and opportunities identified can exceed the organisation’s 
capacity for further analysis, a filtering process is required.
The filtering exercise can be performed according to the following qualitative 
and quantitative criteria:
• Exposure of the organisation
• Vulnerability of the organisation
• Possible impact (and severity of consequences) to the organisation’s 
business or core values
• Estimated likelihood of a threat to materialise
• Available lead time before the threat/opportunity becomes reality
• Awareness level among competitors and civil society
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The emerging risk conductor will select and describe the criteria according 
to the specific needs of the organisation. Filtering should occur each time 
additional knowledge is available, if this knowledge enables a (re)definition 
of priorities. Accordingly, this first filtering process can be revised or com-
pleted once scenarios and narratives have been elaborated upon in Step 2, 
offering a more comprehensive description of the set of threats/opportunities 
at hand. Filtering is not a neutral process. The choice of filters that select 
which information produced by horizon scanning will be used for strategic 
planning, decision-making (Ilmola-Sheppard, 2014) or in-depth exploration 
of emerging risks (Step 2) can have a large influence on the outcome.
In general, it is extremely difficult for an organisation to prioritise emerging 
threats or risks. It may prove to be more productive to adopt a risk-based 
approach to decision-making (for example prioritising investment) based on 
resources, capabilities and return on investment (see Step 3). The following 
examples show how organisations can proceed with the filtering process.
National Risk Assessments are being developed in countries 
whose governments wish to conduct comprehensive iden-
tification, prioritisation and assessment of the major risks 
(resulting, for example, from natural hazards, pandemics or 
terrorism) that may affect the national and societal security 
of the country.
In the Netherlands, for instance, threat prioritisation is per-
formed with the aid of experts according to the following 
impact criteria (BZK, 2009):
• Territorial safety, divided into “encroachment of territo-
rial integrity of the Netherlands” and “infringement of the 
international position of the Netherlands”
• Physical safety, regarding “fatalities”, “the seriously injured 
and chronically ill” and “physical suffering (lack of basic 
necessities of life)”
• Economic safety, evaluated according to a cost criterion.
• Ecological safety, describing the long-term impact on flora 
and fauna
• Social and political stability, appreciated according to 
three criteria, “disruption of everyday life”, “violation of the 
democratic system” and “social and psychological impact”
A two-dimensional diagram provides a graphic representa-
tion of the threats and their criticality (likelihood and impact), 
permitting the selection of those deserving further analysis in 
the next steps. In addition, capabilities are analysed to decide 
which threats the government can aim to deal with.
Box 4: Characterising and prioritising threats - The Dutch National Risk Assessment
Figure 4: Example of a national risk prioritisation approach (Source: BZK, 2009)
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The Institute for Environment, Health, Risk and Futures 
(IEHRF) at Cranfield University performs regular horizon-scan-
ning exercises allowing the identification and prioritisation 
of emerging issues considered of importance for the entire 
society, including economic, environmental and social di-
mensions. The impact of these issues can be identified as 
either a threat or an opportunity or both, depending on the 
particular viewpoints of the observers, and is classified using 
risk prioritisation criteria. The issues are presented to illus-
trate a measure for importance, which combines levels of 
likelihood and expected impact, and a time horizon, which 
shows the current understanding of the expected timeline for 
the impact’s occurrence. In the October 2013 “IEHRF Horizon 
Scan”, 24 distinct threats and opportunities were identified 
and rated as shown in Figure 5.
The time horizon axis represents the expected time of im-
pact and not the time required for decision-making. However, 
threats and opportunities categorised as possibly occurring 
ten years or more from now may still require an immediate 
decision.
Box 5: Using horizon scanning to prioritise threats and opportunities
Figure 5: Example of threat and opportunity ratings
(Source: Rathe, et al., 2013)
It should be noted that scenario development can become expensive and 
time-consuming. Many organisations do not have the resources to undertake 
this costly exercise, but can find relevant material elsewhere. Additionally, 
scenarios can be out of date before they are published, as they take long to 
develop. It may be sufficient to use readily available scenarios and tailor them 
to the receiving audience / organisation. However, as pointed out by Healey 
and Hodgkinson (2008), there are occasions when this approach might not 
yield the benefits expected, due to a lack of engagement on the part of the 
recipients. Generating the scenarios from scratch, through a process of active 
mental simulation and engagement provides a more direct and immediate 
assessment of emerging risks – which is what most organisations are looking 
to accomplish.
An illustration is provided in Appendix 2.3: The use of signals and early 
warnings in technology management.
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STEP 2
DEVELOP SCENARIOS BASED 
ON NARRATIVES & MODELS
REQUIRED ACTIONS
• Develop or use various types of 
scenarios to explore and evaluate 
the emerging risk that could affect the 
organisation in the future.
• Begin to identify possible bifurcations 
and intervention points, to prepare the 
development of management options.
• Update the scenarios as necessary, 
taking into account the emergence 
of new signals and the outcome of 
strategic interactions with stakeholders.
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
• Set of explorative scenarios. The scenarios describe how the threats 
and opportunities identified in Step 1 may have an impact on the 
organisation. Particular attention must be given to:
∙ The contributing factors (amplifying or attenuating).
∙ Events or tipping points that may accelerate, reduce or generally 
affect the factors.
∙ The consequences of each scenario for the organisation.
• Familiarity with concepts. During the process, participants 
will become increasingly familiar with new concepts (e.g. “low-
probability / high-consequence events”), contributing to a common 
understanding of possible future developments.
KEY PARTICIPANTS         & RESPONSIBILITIES
Experts in futures studies .................. facilitate interactions between contributors and ensure the scientific
& scenario-building techniques validity of the scenario development exercise.
Emerging risk conductor ................... ensures the coherence of the exercise with the threats and opportunities 
defined in Step 1 and the organisation’s expectations.
Decision-makers ................................ confirm their commitment, in particular by allocating resources,  
providing reward and assigning responsibilities.
• Relevance to the concerns and needs of the decision-makers
• Credibility, to assess the scientific soundness of the models and data used as well as the 
transparency of the choices made at each step of the process
• Comprehensibility and traceability, to describe the clarity of the sequence of events adopted 
to structure the scenarios and the ability of final users to easily understand and follow the 
underlying rationality
• Legitimacy, through openness of the process to various stakeholders, promoting different values 
and political orientations
• Creativity, to stimulate new ways of thinking and dealing with the “unusual”
• Distinctness, to assess the ability of the scenarios to jointly convey to decision-makers the 
diversity of possible futures
KEY  
SUCCESS  
FACTORS
KEY OBJECTIVE: DEVELOP SCENARIOS
Step 2 describes scenarios of how an emerging risk or opportunity could impact an organisation and its objectives. It: 
• Offers the possibility for collaborative framing of existing and future threats and opportunities.
• Provides evidence and support for future decisions concerning the identified threats and opportunities.
• Updates the scenarios as new information and knowledge become available.
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What to do and how
At this stage, potential threats as well as possible opportunities have been 
identified. Their potential impact on the organisation’s future must now be 
further analysed. By adopting a forward-looking approach, Step 2 will rely 
on scenarios (based on models and narratives) to describe how threats and 
opportunities may become risks that need to be managed, or may develop 
into opportunities that need to be pursued to transform them into compe- 
titive advantages. The incentive for the risk manager here is to help his / her 
organisation harness risk but also to explore new opportunities. 
Developing and using scenarios implies a process of looking to the future 
and developing possible stories about how it may unfold. Organisations can 
also use scenarios that have already been developed and move directly to 
identifying the implications – both risks and opportunities.
Scenarios represent combinations of formal models and plausible narratives 
(Helgeson, van der Linden, & Chabay, 2012; Wilkinson & Kupers, 2014). De-
pending on the topic and the state of the art of available knowledge, scenarios 
differ in the composition of formal modelling and storytelling. Some scenarios 
pursue well-known causal or functional relationships and vary primarily in 
their assumptions. In contrast, others develop imaginative futures based on 
basic knowledge, formal logic and plausibility. Almost all scenarios include 
methods to involve multiple actors and factors in the description of what the 
future could look like. Explorative scenarios ask “what if ?” questions to look 
into alternative views of the future and create plausible stories from them. 
They consider long-term trends in society, the economy, policy or technology 
(relevant to the field in which the organisation develops), as well as factors 
that could trigger shifts in these trends. Visions of the future are thus built in 
an open process, the result of which represents the participants’ points of 
view. For the purpose of this report, scenarios are defined as hypothetical 
sequences of events constructed for focusing attention on causal processes 
and decision points (Kahn & Wiener, 1968). Both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches of scenario elaboration have been considered within this work.
Scenarios are not meant to predict the future but, in the specific context 
of ERG, they can help to structure and organise the many uncertainties 
decision-makers are confronted with. Scenarios are used by organisations 
looking to enhance their ability to deal with the inherently uncertain and 
complex character of their environment (Healey & Hodgkinson, 2008). The 
benefits of this approach range from considering uncertainty in strategic 
decision-making to organisational learning and the construction of a common 
understanding among participants. There is, moreover, growing evidence that 
scenario planning is contributing effectively to the development of competitive 
advantages for organisations. 9
The selection and use of scenarios depend largely on the context and the 
objectives. If the original aim of scenario development was purely norma-
9 See Mannermaa, 1986; Rohrbeck, Arnold, & Heuer, 2007.
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tive at first, advances in this field have led to three types of purposes and 
associated practices 10: 
• Predictive scenarios describe and anticipate what will happen if the rules that 
have been governing the system’s development thus far continue into the 
future. These types of scenarios tend to be described as business as usual.
• Explorative scenarios acknowledge the possibility that different futures could 
develop from current conditions. Divergent futures may result from known or 
unknown trends and events for which a probability distribution does not exist.
• Normative scenarios are usually based on backcasting. The first step 
in a backcasting approach is to define the desirable end-state, most 
often through a multi-stakeholder (participatory) process. Because of this 
visioning process, such scenarios are considered normative.
Explorative scenarios
Explorative scenarios are funnel-based approaches (Kosow & Gassner, 
2008) that imagine various possible futures based on current knowledge 
and trends (Figure 6). In the case of ERG, explorative scenarios focus on the 
construction of plausible sequences 
of events where present threats and 
opportunities may become risks to 
be managed or competitive advan-
tages to be pursued. Practitioners 
must also consider the possible im-
pact of extreme variations in known 
distributions, as well as disruptive 
events and surprises often referred 
to as “black swans” (Taleb, 2007) The 
goal is to ensure that the exercise 
can also support the development 
of resilience capabilities in Step 3.
The type of scenario development suggested here differs from the exploration 
of threats and opportunities conducted in Step 1, whose purpose was to 
imagine and describe the evolution of contexts where threats or opportu-
nities may arise. In this second step, the objective of the exploration is to 
examine the impact of a set of identified threats to and opportunities for the 
organisation’s strategy.
Explorative scenarios are widely used in organisational practices. However, 
practitioners should be aware of the following limits and biases when en-
gaging in this exercise:
• Both extreme (“worst-case”) scenarios and “reference” scenarios must be 
considered, to explore the full range of possibilities.
• If a set of scenarios is too large, it may be cognitively and organisationally 
difficult to use. On the other hand, a set of scenarios that is too narrow will 
not be representative of the variety of possible futures based on current 
Figure 6: Funnel-shaped model of the 
variety of possible futures
(Source: Schüll & Schröter, 2013)
10 See also van Notten, 2006; Börjeson et al., 2006; Vergragt & Quist, 2011.
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knowledge. Scenarios must be clearly differentiated and include the 
consideration of extreme events.
• Cognitive (and emotional) biases may mislead scenario construction 
and exploitation (Healey & Hodgkinson, 2008, 2011). Overestimating the 
probability of scenarios that seem to be more plausible, not giving the 
same consideration to a variety of plausible futures and not considering 
how various affective mechanisms may influence choices are examples 
of such biases. It is therefore highly recommended to appoint an external 
facilitator who will organise and moderate interactions between participants 
and ensure rigour in the process.
• A superficial description of scenarios will be of limited usefulness to 
decision-makers. Comprehensive and thorough scenario descriptions are 
likely to support work in Step 3 where management options and decision 
opportunities have to be identified. Moreover, they will provide a better 
understanding of the consequences of these decisions.
• The quality of scenario descriptions should be informed by the following 
criteria: Make an explicit description of the proposed hypotheses, 
mechanisms and events that are retained as well as those that are not 
retained, highlight the contributing factors to risk emergence and evaluate 
the impact on the organisation.
Predictive and normative scenarios can be used in combination with explo- 
rative scenarios. They are useful to identify risk management options and 
intervention points, and thus inform decision-making exercises.
Intervention points
The development of scenarios involves the identification of drivers, but also 
of critical events that may trigger critical transitions and change the course 
of the risk development. It results that specific intervention points can be 
pre-identified and will be used for selecting and deploying specific manage-
ment options in Step 3.
Filtering and prioritisation
As models and narratives enable risk managers to improve their understanding 
of how threats and opportunities will or could influence an organisation’s values 
and assets, additional filtering and prioritisation processes – using the same 
criteria as described in Step 1 – can be performed. This may provide additional 
evidence of the impact or the absence of real impact on the organisation. In 
the latter case, more threats and opportunities may be decommissioned.
Methodology and example
A methodological note on scenario development is provided in Appendix 
2.4. In addition to theoretical considerations, it provides three examples of 
scenarios exploring the possible development of the increasing trend towards 
obesity. It highlights some key features of scenario development and how 
methodological choices may influence the final output.
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STEP 3
GENERATE RISK MANAGEMENT  
OPTIONS & FORMULATE STRATEGY
REQUIRED ACTIONS
• Identify and evaluate possible emerging risk 
management options according to the scenarios 
developed in Step 2 and the strategy. No option should 
be excluded.
• Define intervention points (windows of opportunity) 
and indicators, including the most adequate conditions 
for each option. Select those options that align with the 
organisation’s strategy for dealing with the emerging 
risk. Consider the organisation’s decision-making style, 
available resources and risk appetite.
• Identify thresholds of irreversibility after which 
interventions will no longer be effective, and thresholds 
of acceptability, below which no intervention is needed.
• Communicate this process and the decision that has 
been made in a transparent manner.
• Include uncertainty: being aware of what is unknown.
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
• Management strategies for each scenario: Step 
3 is designed to provide a strategy for each of the 
scenarios developed in Step 2. The description 
of the strategy, its expected performance and the 
key trade-offs adopted by decision-makers must 
be made explicit.
• A final decision as to which emerging risk 
management option(s) will be implemented.
KEY PARTICIPANTS            & RESPONSIBILITIES
Decision-makers at the strategic level ..... select options and demonstrate leadership, especially when it comes 
to challenging comfortable or routine practices not suited to changing 
environments.
Emerging risk conductor ........................... facilitates the decision-making process and ensures that decisions 
are made.
• Flexibility for adaptation and adjustment to new evidence when it becomes available
• Consistency with organisational values and culture as well as with procedures
• Internal openness and transparency of the process
• Clear prioritisation of actions, taking expected impacts and available resources into account 
• Revision of the strategy if context and conditions change
KEY  
SUCCESS  
FACTORS
KEY OBJECTIVE: MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE MANAGEMENT OF AN EMERGING RISK
Step 3 designs strategies for the management of emerging risks that are proactive, effective, cost-efficient 
and adaptive in order to deal adequately with the risks and opportunities explored in Step 2.
Option 1 
Act on the factors that 
contribute to risk emergence
Option 3
 Reduce vulnerability
Option 5
 Use risk governance instru-
ments to manage familiar risk
Option 2
 Develop precautionary 
approaches
Option 4
 Modify the risk appetite  
in line with new risk
Option 6
 Do nothing
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What to do and how
An important component of effective ERG is making the right decision at the 
right time. To determine what risk management measures are appropriate and 
needed, ERG practitioners face the complex challenge of making decisions 
in a situation of uncertainty about what they need to manage and how.
The third step of the guidelines will use the output of the scanning, foresight 
and analysis capabilities deployed in Steps 1 and 2.
Strategy is about an organisation’s direction and scope over the long term 
(Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 2008). This implies dealing with complex-
ity and uncertainty caused by both 
external and internal interdepen- 
dent and uncertain factors, and with 
ill-structured and non-routine issues 
(Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 
1976). Strategy implementation will 
trigger “waves” of decision-making 
at lower levels of the organisation. 
Decision science 11  will be useful, 
especially in the face of situations 
that are new, complex, uncertain or 
ambiguous.
Risk management is possible when 
several options are considered and 
assessed, and one or several are 
chosen as a strategy. In this section, 
methodological challenges that an-
alysts (and the conductor) as well 
as decision-makers may face at this 
stage are examined.
Generating the strategy and options for implementation
To avoid binary (yes/no) options, a set of options for each possible intervention 
point in every scenario is needed. In the development of dynamic systems, 
windows of opportunity for intervention appear, but often only for a short 
period. Therefore, interventions must be prepared in advance and must be 
ready for deployment at the right moment. IRGC suggests a typology of 
possible strategies representing the scope of what can be done when facing 
emerging risk. These six strategic options are not mutually exclusive and can 
be partly combined. 
Generating the strategy and options for implementation
• What strategy and options could respond to the emerging risk?
• When could these options be implemented? What would be the 
intervention timing?
Evaluating the strategic options
• What criteria will be used to assess and evaluate the options to 
provide the best response to the variety of possible futures?
• How will the performance of the management options be evaluated?
Making robust decisions
• What decision-making approach will be chosen? How?
• What option or combination of options will be decided?
• What is the timing for implementation?
Figure 7: Step 3 of the guidelines
11 Decision science involves the application of quantitative and behavioural methods to the problems of society to study human 
decision-making behaviour.
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Option 1: Acting on the factors that contribute  
to risk emergence or amplification
Some of the factors that contribute to risk emergence are controllable (IRGC, 
2010a). In those cases, an organisation can act to prevent a risk from emerging 
(or amplifying) or can reduce its consequences if it materialises. Scientific 
uncertainties or information asymmetries are examples of risk factors that can 
be controlled within certain limits. An organisation can exercise this control 
individually or with others. Acting on certain factors can only be achieved by 
means of a collaborative strategy involving various stakeholders (regulatory 
bodies, exposed organisations, insurers, etc.), either because the resources 
required are too costly for each organisation or simply because regulatory or 
societal shifts might be required. For example, mitigating the consequences 
of solar storms on electricity grids requires considerable investment and 
broad co-operation to increase redundancies and (re)install the required 
safety margins.
The quality of the scenario descriptions is particularly important here. It will 
be easier to identify and deal with the contributing factors if the drivers and 
mechanisms of possible development are thoroughly described and analysed 
during Step 2.
REACH is a European regulation that aims to manage risks in 
industry related to chemical substances. It is in line with the 
chemical industry’s Responsible Care Initiative. Industries are 
required to demonstrate the safety of the chemical substances 
they use through effective risk management or to replace them 
with safer substances.
The European Chemicals Agency is in charge of the registra-
tion process by which the substance properties are assessed 
and the risk management actions in place are evaluated. A 
substance can be banned, restricted to priority uses or au-
thorised.
Box 6: REACH, a strategy to act on factors contributing to risk emergence
The registration process adopted by the EU acts on factors 
contributing to risk emergence at different levels, seeking in 
particular to:
•  Avoid or reduce information asymmetries. Each substance 
can be registered only once. Therefore, all industries that 
consider its use must disclose information and knowledge 
on the substance’s properties. By fostering stakeholder 
co-operation at the early stages of substance develop-
ment, REACH reduces information asymmetries between 
industrial stakeholders.
•  Reduce scientific unknowns. REACH decreases scientific 
unknowns by encouraging interaction and cross-fertilisation 
between industries.
Option 2: Developing precautionary approaches
Trying to avoid the risk – or at least the occurrence of any of its irreversi-
ble consequences – can represent a valuable management option in cases 
where the risk evaluation results in reasoned assumptions of unacceptable 
consequences. Strictly speaking, risk avoidance consists in circumventing 
or neglecting the activity that creates the risk. The activity is prohibited or 
proscribed. For example, insurance companies can exclude the coverage of 
cybersecurity attacks until they have developed methods to measure the risk.
Precautionary approaches should be chosen on a case-by-case basis, in 
relation to a desired level of protection against identified potential risks. The 
European Commission provides recommendations related to factors that 
More information: echa.europa.eu/regulations/reach
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should trigger precautionary measures and guidelines for applying them 
(European Commission, 2000).
Precautionary approaches should focus on identifying possible courses of 
action where opportunities exist, but the likely consequences of risk exposure 
are limited and at least partially reversible. Obviously, this subtle balance 
cannot be maintained endlessly and it is important to identify the point at 
which more decisive actions are needed. This does not mean, however, that 
the organisation should adopt a wait-and-see strategy.
In the case of large epistemic uncertainty about an emerging risk, more 
research and monitoring are necessary. The available lead time 12 allowing, 
decision-makers must also invest in deepening their knowledge and under-
standing of the mechanisms described in the scenario before making a final 
decision. Knowledge gaps can be filled through research, monitoring and 
early-warning activities.
Market authorisation for new drugs is a decision process 
constrained by the need to accelerate the deployment of 
potentially more effective therapies, while protecting patients 
from residual uncertainties about side effects. Several scan-
dals (for example, Mediator in France (2009), Desplex in the 
United States (1970), human growth hormones) have demon-
strated the catastrophic effects of delayed consequences that 
had not been considered or had been overlooked during the 
licensing procedure. Consequently, the yes/no authorisation 
process has largely proven ineffective in preventing the com-
mercialisation of dangerous drugs or in withdrawing them 
quickly from the market.
Box 7: Adaptive licensing in pharmaceutical regulation
In 2014, the European Medicines Agency launched a pilot 
project on Adaptive Licensing based on a life-cycle vision of 
the product. Instead of a full authorisation or a ban, a stag-
gered authorisation process was put in place, starting from 
a limited process and moving to a progressively extended 
indication of use documentation system as more evidence 
and knowledge became available. At each stage of the au-
thorisation process, the main concern lays with balancing the 
trade-off between expected benefits and the requirement to 
avoid any irreversible harm.
Option 3: Reducing vulnerability
If the organisation cannot (or finds it difficult to) identify any opportunity to 
act upon the sequence of events leading to a risk, or if the intervention is 
considered inappropriate or too costly, a reduction in the exposure, or an 
effort to decrease vulnerability to the risk agent can be a strategic option. 
Two possibilities can be considered:
• In the case of emerging but well identified risks, it is possible to reduce 
sensitivity to the risk by developing redundancies, improving personnel 
training or readjusting protection capabilities.
• In the case of unexpected events, building resilience may be an appropriate 
strategy. This implies considering worst-case scenarios to ensure that 
organisations will be able to withstand unexpected shocks, rebound to a 
desired equilibrium while adapting to the changed context and, in general, 
recover from any levels of stress while preserving operational continuity. 
Decentralising decisions, enabling self-organisation and social networking, 
12 Before the risk has an impact on the organisation in a significant way.
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The response to Hurricane Katrina that hit the Gulf of Mexico 
and the city of New Orleans in 2005 is often used as an exam- 
ple of organisational failure to anticipate and react to major 
disruptive events. However, Hurricane Katrina also revealed 
some successful strategies based on improving resilience to 
cope with unforeseen events. Walmart stores were able to 
provide food and water to the most impacted areas of New 
Orleans much faster than the US Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Authority. In the three weeks following Katrina’s landfall, 
Walmart shipped 2,500 truckloads of merchandise and 
made additional drivers and trucks available for community 
members and organisations wishing to help (Horwitz, 2009). 
The following factors explain the resilience of the logistics 
chain put in place by Walmart:
Capacity building
• A dedicated business continuity unit, staffed by six to ten 
employees, was already routinely operating in 2005. In case 
of major events, the team was expandable to 60 people, 
including senior representatives from each of the compa-
ny’s functional areas.
• The company used its own hurricane tracker software and 
had contracts with private forecasters to obtain reliable and 
updated information in a timely manner.
Decentralisation
• Walmart’s senior management gave district and store 
managers enough discretion to make decisions based on 
local information and immediate needs without requiring pre- 
approval. For example, a store manager who was no longer 
Box 8: Walmart’s supply chain logistics resilient to disruptions caused by Hurricane Katrina
able to contact his superiors decided to run a bulldozer 
through the store ruins to recover all products that had not 
been damaged by the water and make them available to 
residents. After the crisis had been abated, local decision-
makers were praised by senior management for their 
actions.
Protocols and preparation
• Protocols to deal with major disruptive events were already 
in place, allowing the organisation to adapt decision-making 
to the evolution of the risk level. For instance, the number 
of personnel who were part of the command centre was 
gradually augmented as the risk increased. Two days before 
the landfall, 50 staff members had joined the team. 
• As uncertainties regarding the areas that would be heavily 
damaged became more tractable, the decision was made 
to move emergency supplies, such as generators, from the 
current warehouse location to “designated staging areas so 
that the stores would be able to open quickly” (Zimmerman 
& Bauerlein, 2005). Those staging areas were set up outside 
the areas most likely to be hit the worst, to facilitate quick 
response with minimal danger (Horwitz, 2009).
The benefit Walmart derived from this kind of preparation 
obviously goes beyond what could be quantified in monetary 
terms.
“The only lifeline in Kenner was the Walmart stores. We didn’t 
have looting on a mass scale because Walmart showed up 
with food and water so our people could survive”. Philip Cap-
itano, Mayor of New Orleans, 2005.
and promoting diversity are examples of approaches that promote 
resilience development (OECD, 2014). A draft framework proposed by the 
World Economic Forum defines resilience characteristics as: robustness 
(referring to the “ability to absorb and withstand disturbances and crises”), 
redundancy (involving “having excess capacity and back-up systems”), and 
resourcefulness (meaning the “ability to adapt to crises, respond flexibly 
and – if possible – transform a negative impact into a positive”). Other 
components of resilience include performance, defined as a combination 
of response (“ability to mobilise quickly in the face of crises”) and recovery 
(“ability to regain a degree of normality after a crisis or event”) (WEF, 2013).
Option 4: Modifying the organisation’s risk appetite in line with a 
new risk
The 2008 financial crisis revealed a significant imbalance between the risks 
some financial institutions were willing to take (risk appetite) and their risk- 
taking capacities (the maximum amount of risk an organisation can sustain, 
or its tolerance to risk) (Barfield, 2007).
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Dealing with emerging risks requires that organisations constantly align their 
risk appetite to changes in their environment and the availability of new 
knowledge and, most importantly, to their resources and capabilities to tole- 
rate or cope with potential risk losses. Such alignment can either be made 
by reducing the level of risk underwritten, according to one or several of the 
three options described above, or by increasing the tolerance for risk. In 
this fourth option, decision-makers do not act on the risk itself or its source. 
Instead, they choose to adapt their coping strategies to the levels of risk that 
are observed or anticipated. They retain the risk, accepting the potential loss, 
by setting aside funds to compensate for a potential future loss.
This option may appeal to decision makers in various contexts; for instance, 
when high value opportunities are expected or when they choose to 
differentiate themselves from their market competitors. In general, risk taking 
is a source of creative innovation, whether technological or social. Risk can 
yield rewards; accordingly, reducing opportunities for informed risk taking 
by companies, governments or the public might also depress opportunities 
for innovation, even in the public sector (OECD, 2010). 
The 2014 UK government chief scientific adviser's annual report emphasises 
that innovation is key for growth, well-being, security and resilience. Hence, 
one of the hardest decisions for governments is to balance risk taking that 
accompanies innovation with risk avoidance, prevention and management. 
This challenge arises, for example, in governmental legislation and regulation 
of new or emerging technologies. The report cites the UK Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Authority that regulates the application of embryology 
The drug licensing equation is based on key aspects, inclu- 
ding innocuousness, safety, efficacy and cost efficiency, which 
translate into fostering rapid access to innovative treatments 
for patients, avoiding negative side effects or risk transfers, 
and optimising resource allocation through the careful evalu- 
ation of treatment efficiency. A poor performance on any of 
these variables represents important risks for patients, licens-
ing authorities and pharmaceutical companies.
Varying stakeholder groups (patients, companies, regulators) 
express different risk appetites, and a balance of interests 
must be achieved with regard to these aspects. The risk ap-
petite might be higher for populations confronted with entirely 
unmet medical needs (for example those affected by a deadly 
virus such as Ebola) than for those disposing of treatments 
although they might wish them to be more efficient. For phar-
maceutical companies, it may also depend on the need to 
develop or update their portfolio of molecules according to 
market evolutions.
To manage this difficult equation and allow both licensing 
authorities and pharmaceutical companies to increase their 
risk appetite to benefit from new opportunities, risk-shar-
ing agreements may offer interesting prospects. Based on 
Box 9: Risk sharing in drug licensing
conditional approval mechanism, risk-sharing aims to re-
distribute risks between treatment users and suppliers. The 
two risk-sharing approaches are finance-based and out-
come-based (OECD, 2013).
• Outcome-based schemes make pharmaceutical compa-
nies’ retribution conditional on treatment performance. If 
the treatment does not prove effective, the supplier will be 
asked to refund treatment costs; otherwise, authorisation 
will be extended and the supplier will collect the benefits 
accruing.
• Finance-based schemes rely on a predefined mechanism 
of cost sharing between the supplier and health authori-
ties. For instance, PFIZER offers the first cycle of treatment 
for its kidney cancer drug Sutent® to UK National Health 
Service patients.
Risk sharing may be a successful mechanism for pharma-
ceutical companies to balance the poor performance of some 
molecules under development in a wider portfolio by the better 
performance of more successful ones. This strategy allows 
regulators and companies to increase their risk appetite, thus 
rewarding research and innovation. 
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Infectious diseases in general, and malaria in particular, 
are sensitive to climatic conditions. Pascual, et al. (2006) 
have already observed that warmer years aggravate malaria 
epidemics in the highlands of Africa and South America. In 
addition to general temperature fluctuations, global warming 
is expected to affect various parameters that influence the 
spread of malaria: rainfall (IPCC, 2001), ultraviolet intensity and 
rising sea levels (Lipp, Huq, & Colwell, 2002). Consequently, 
in the coming years the disease may affect high altitude 
Box 10: Warmer temperatures push malaria to new altitudes
populations usually protected from malaria because of low 
temperatures.
Although protocols for preventing and treating malaria 
are well known, it will be necessary to ensure that the risk 
management tools developed elsewhere can be transferred 
to the new areas and newly exposed populations and that 
adequate organisational capabilities are put in place.
Option 5: Using “conventional” risk governance instruments  
to manage familiar risks
When familiar risks evolve in new or changing contexts, it is reasonable to 
consider and adopt risk management options used for the governance of 
familiar (as opposed to emerging) risks. The greatest challenge when dealing 
with this kind of risk is organisational awareness of the contextual evolution. 
Using conventional risk governance mechanisms would be relevant when, 
for example, malaria spreads to higher latitudes and altitudes due to climate 
change (see Box 10) as it is a familiar 
risk developing in new conditions.
The IRGC risk governance frame-
work (Figure 8) provides a holistic 
and comprehensive approach to 
familiar risks. It is suitable for risks 
marked by complexity, uncertainty 
and ambiguity, and in particular for 
risks labelled as systemic (OECD, 
2003). One important aspect of the 
framework is the acknowledgment 
that there may be a gap between 
how people perceive risk and how 
experts assess it. This is often par-
ticularly relevant for risks with which 
people and organisations are unfa-
miliar.
If risk assessment provides a tangible and (if possible) quantifiable outcome, 
it becomes possible to choose specific management options, such as risk 
reduction mechanisms, that reduce the probability of occurrence and severity 
of a risk event’s impact (codes and standards, self-regulation, enforcement 
and compliance). Risk transfer mechanisms are also worth considering, as in 
compulsory or voluntary insurance schemes, or transfer to financial markets 
(for example via the emission of bonds).
Figure 8: IRGC risk governance 
framework
(Source: IRGC, 2005)
research to reproductive and regenerative medicine, a field where many 
promising opportunities conflict with potential, yet unknown risks (UK Gov-
ernment Office for Science, 2014).
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Option 6: Doing nothing
If, at the end of Step 2, the conductor concludes that the possible evolution 
of a certain potential threat (identified in Step 1) will not pose a risk to the 
organisation, he / she can propose to do nothing. This means that the threat 
is not considered plausible enough, or its impact important enough, to trigger 
any action at that time. This does not prevent the organisation from continuing 
the monitoring process, as the situation may change over time.
All the strategic options described above must be accompanied by continu- 
ous monitoring and the analysis of changes in the organisation’s external 
and internal environments, and decisions must be revised accordingly. This 
is further discussed in Step 5.
Evaluating the strategic options
The evaluation of strategic options depends primarily on:
1. The state of development of the emerging risk and the level of knowledge 
about it
When little is known about the threat but it potentially has severe negative 
consequences, precaution-based and resilience-focused strategies can 
ensure the reversibility of critical decisions and increase the system’s 
coping capacity so it can withstand shocks or adapt to new contextual 
conditions. A case in point are new materials (such as nanomaterials) with 
potentially unknown effects. But when a well-known risk develops in new 
contexts, increasing the risk appetite or considering risk management 
instruments used for familiar risks is advisable.
2. The set of evaluation criteria that the decision-makers will choose to adopt
• Effectiveness: To what extent does the selected option achieve 
satisfactory performance in accordance with the decision-makers' 
expectations? 
• Efficiency: Does the selected option provide satisfactory performance 
at a minimum cost? 
• Sustainability: How does the option perform in economic, ecological 
and social terms?
• Sociopolitical acceptability: How does the option address issues of 
equity or distribution of costs and benefits among stakeholders?
• Ethical standards: Is corporate responsibility enhanced? To what extent 
is the distribution of benefits and risks considered fair?
Having generated and evaluated possible options, decision-makers will se-
lect the strategy (including the combination of options) they consider most 
adapted to their organisation’s needs and culture.
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Making robust decisions
When dealing with uncertainties, decision science distinguishes between 
contexts where probability distributions – either derived by frequencies or 
Bayesian judgments or by intelligent guessing – are available and where 
they are not.
When probability distributions are available from past experiences or reliable 
models, the Maximizing Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1947; Savage, 1954) is the dominant paradigm. It asserts that rational de-
cision-makers should adopt the decision that optimises the combination 
of probability and consequences, the latter being modelled through utility 
functions. This includes when subjective probabilities are obtainable and 
experts do not dispute these probability judgments.
When there are no reliable probability distributions for the various possi-
ble futures and when scenario outcomes are highly sensitive to changing 
hypotheses, the terms severe or deep uncertainty are used (Ben-Haim, 2001; 
Lempert et al., 2006). Optimisation does not mean much when the conse-
quences of a course of action are uncertain. In such contexts, looking for 
optimisation may be futile and even dangerous as the gain expected from 
selecting one option for a given scenario may turn into a loss if another 
scenario materialises. Decision scientists have developed other methods 
to deal with this type of uncertainty; one relies on simple criteria reflecting 
decision-makers’ attitudes towards risks. For instance, maximising minimum 
payoffs (MaxMin) or maximising maximum payoffs (MaxMax) are decision 
criteria respectively reflecting pessimistic and optimistic visions of the future 
when dealing with deep uncertainties.
However, these methods may prove to be too simplistic to deal with long-term 
and complex emerging issues, where objective probabilities are not availa-
ble. The concept of robustness in decision-making, defined as the ability 
of decisions to display good enough – though not optimal – performances 
for various possible futures, may be more useful. Robustness in decision- 
making reflects the willingness of decision-makers to abandon the advantag-
es of optimisation to gain a higher ability to cope with subjective probabilities 
(that are revised in light of new information) and generally uncertain futures 
(Rosenhead, Elton, & Gupta, 1972; Schoemaker, 1995; Lempert et al., 2006). 
Robust methods are most useful when reliable statistical data or unambiguous 
and convincing subjective estimates for probabilities cannot be obtained.
Developing robust and effective processes for guiding decision-making can 
be achieved by various means. At the core of these different operational 
approaches and mathematical models, lies the idea that decision-making 
should be less about planning and acting and more about continuously 
planning and adapting to situations (Rosenhead, Elton, & Gupta, 1972) 13. In 
the field of climate change, the response to climate-related risks depends 
on improvements in scientific assessment as well as on the capability of risk 
managers to revise their decisions when new knowledge becomes available 
13 See Appendix 2.5 for an illustration of this idea and the description of practical approaches for applying robustness to strategic 
decision-making.
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(IPCC, 2014). Decision-making in the face of emerging risk similarly requires 
iterative risk management in order to foster effective adaptation. This is also 
important for familiar risks, but the more one expects uncertain outcomes, 
the more flexibility and adaptive capacity are needed to deal with variations 
in outcome or even surprises.
Criteria for making good decisions under conditions of uncertainty include:
• Consistency and procedural rationality, emphasising the importance of 
established, transparent and applied procedures, that are specific but can 
also be harmonised across organisations
• Use of all available information, considering subjective probability and / or 
reliability
• Acceptability, which may require participatory processes so decisions can 
be shared between the authority in charge and those who provided inputs 
during the decision making process
• A judgment made by the decision-maker on the extent to which his / her 
possible error is likely to undermine economic performance, his / her 
reputation and, overall, the benefits of his / her decision.
Timing of actions
Intervention points must be defined in advance, according to the possible 
development of the emerging risk. This can be the case when new know- 
ledge is available or when the political agenda changes, as a result of or 
resulting in a change in perception and concern about the risk. When quick 
responses are needed, it is extremely useful to have prepared response 
options that address the real cause(s) of the problem and not just solutions 
that tackle the surface level symptoms.
A methodological note on robust decision-making is provided in 
Appendix 2.5.
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STEP 4
IMPLEMENT 
STRATEGY
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
• Translation of the strategic objectives into individual 
and collective objectives at the various levels of the 
organisation.
• Implementation of the decisions made in Step 3.
KEY PARTICIPANTS     & RESPONSIBILITIES
Strategic decision-makers ......... endorse the responsibility of implementing the strategy; appoint a
(e.g. chief risk officer) dedicated team.
Risk owner (if any) ....................... effectively manages the risk and opportunity for which he / she is responsible,  
and is rewarded accordingly.
Other relevant stakeholders ....... translate the strategic decisions into concrete actions.
Emerging risk conductor ............ provides complementary knowledge or expertise regarding the risks  
and opportunities considered.
• Transparency through effective and continuous communication about the strategic objectives 
and decisions at all levels of the organisation
• Including relevant stakeholders for the evaluation of the strategy relevance and effectiveness, 
and timely reaction to resolve conflicts and trade-offs
• Continuous monitoring through the early detection of difficulties and conflicts (with bottom-
up reporting)
• Continuous interactions with the emerging risk conductor to re-evaluate the relevance of the 
strategy in light of new signals and knowledge, if necessary
KEY  
SUCCESS  
FACTORS
REQUIRED ACTIONS
• Put in place the internal and external communication 
capacities required for a common understanding of the 
objectives and the rationale behind them.
• Allocate resources to match operational capabilities with 
strategic orientations.
• Clearly define roles, responsibilities and incentives 
according to the strategic options adopted.
• Support strategy implementation by ensuring adequate 
authority in all phases and enabling the creation of 
appropriate risk cultures.
KEY OBJECTIVE: IMPLEMENT STRATEGY
Step 4 deals with implementing strategy options decided in Step 3. 
Creating supportive conditions for the organisational, technical and cultural shifts required for the effective 
deployment of risk management options is crucial.
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What to do and how
At the end of Step 3, strategies for dealing with emerging risk have been 
designed and decisions have been made. Although relevant strategies are 
sometimes difficult to conceive, they can be even more difficult to apply 
(Noble, 1999a; Hrebiniak, 2006). A summary of the interventions required 
to transform strategy into action for each of the six strategic options pre-
sented in Step 3 follows. Supportive conditions for strategy implementation 
are described in Appendix 2.6 and include: how the organisation’s internal 
and external communications are organised; the allocation of resources; the 
roles, responsibilities and rewards in place; and the appropriate leadership 
and culture needed. These conditions contribute to organisational change 
and to the success of the chosen strategy.
Option 1: Acting on the factors that contribute  
to risk emergence or amplification
Option 1 involves clearly communicating, both internally and externally, the 
link between the contributing factors and the emerging threats and oppor-
tunities. Working early to manage the controllable factors and establishing a 
bottom-up feedback system will benefit the organisation and should be com-
municated internally, while external stakeholders should be prompted to help 
deal with the contributing factors. The organisation must assess the resources 
required to control the factors and define a clear role for itself, comparing 
it to that of other organisations also able to contribute to controlling certain 
factors. Besides setting metrics to monitor the situation, the organisation’s 
leadership should provide momentum and vision, set priorities, and assign 
risk ownership, rewards and incentives. Continuous monitoring and analysis 
of changes in the organisation’s external and internal environment will help 
determine if decisions need to be revised accordingly.
Option 2: Developing precautionary approaches
In adopting Option 2, the organisation must explain internally the relevant 
conditions and justification for developing the precautionary approach to 
the risks. To reinforce internal support for this option, bottom-up feedback 
loops should be established. Externally, exchanging information with other 
organisations affected by the same emerging risk will help, as will identify-
ing partnerships (e.g. research, monitoring) that can reduce uncertainties. 
Translating the precautionary approach into objectives and practices at the 
various decision-making levels will require allocating appropriate resources; 
assigning or reviewing risk ownership, rewards and incentives; making any 
required trade-offs; and setting metrics to monitor the situation. The organ-
isation’s leadership must resolve any conflicts and ensure coherence and 
fairness in the process throughout the operational units. The organisation 
must also analyse changes in its external and internal environment in the 
event decisions need to be revised as a consequence.
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Option 3: Reducing vulnerability
For Option 3, the organisation must work at the right decision levels inter-
nally to communicate emerging risk vulnerabilities and solicit employees 
for relevant inputs, particularly about any unaddressed weaknesses. Exter-
nally, it should evaluate supply-chain partners’ resilience (given their links 
to suppliers and customers), and communicate emerging risk strategies to 
those potentially affected by the same risks. Demonstrating a reliable safety 
performance can benefit the organisation and serve as a competitive advan-
tage. The skills required for planned actions to reduce vulnerability must be 
assessed, and a risk manager should be identified and budgets allocated, all 
the while ensuring cost effectiveness. Implementation should include metrics, 
as well as rewards and incentives for success. The leadership must resolve 
any conflicts throughout, and ensure fairness and coherence of practices 
across the operational units. The organisation must continuously monitor 
and analyse changes in its external and internal environment in the event 
decisions need to be revised accordingly.
Option 4: Modifying the organisation’s risk appetite  
in line with a new risk
Option 4 is driven by an evaluation of the organisation’s tolerance to an 
emerging risk. When the decision is to increase the risk appetite (and retain 
the risk), the organisation needs to communicate internally about the limits of 
such an increase and its everyday consequences. Externally, the organisation 
must explain the rationale for its decision while making sure it preserves its 
reputation. It must also monitor other stakeholders’ strategies. Resources 
are required for the latter, and to make provisions for additional losses. A 
risk owner should be identified, and incentives and rewards adapted to the 
risk-taking strategy. The leadership must resolve any conflicts and support 
the process by ensuring coherence and fairness of practices across the op-
erational units. The organisation must continuously monitor developments 
and analyse changes in its external and internal environment in the event 
decisions need to be revised as a result. 
Option 5: Using “conventional” risk governance instruments  
to manage familiar risks
Case 1 – When an organisation has no existing risk governance framework: 
The organisation must explain the need for such a framework and, subse-
quently, ensure its personnel knows about the one used and its implications 
for everyday activities. Externally, the organisation should encourage the 
development of dedicated regulation; regularly inform regulatory bodies, 
business partners and local communities about its efforts; and share ex-
periences with organisations dealing with the same risk. Budgets for these 
activities need to be allocated, and the required capacities for implementing 
them developed.
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Case 2 – When an organisation extends an existing risk management frame-
work to a new risk: 
As expanding an existing framework may be perceived as inaction or man-
agement’s lack of situational awareness, internal and external communication 
are needed to express the organisation’s cognisance of the threat or opportu-
nity and, when necessary, to explain the rationale for its strategy. Additional 
resources may be needed for a risk assessment and evaluation, as well as 
for the management and communication strategy.
In both cases:
The organisation must assign risk ownership if the risk is established and 
sufficient knowledge exists to implement a conventional risk management 
framework. After clear responsibilities in the framework are assigned, opera-
tional tasks can be translated to employees, with associated incentives and 
rewards. No major changes in the organisation’s leadership and culture are 
foreseen. However, the organisation must continuously monitor and analyse 
changes in its external and internal environment in the event decisions need 
to be revised as a consequence.
Option 6: Doing nothing
Because inaction may be perceived as management’s lack of awareness or 
misinterpretation of an emerging risk’s severity, the organisation’s internal 
and external communication for Option 6 must show that it recognises the 
threat or opportunity and can explain its rationale behind the chosen strategy 
to do nothing. While the organisation needs to identify resources required 
for continuous monitoring, no adjustments to roles, responsibilities or the 
reward system, or major changes to the leadership or culture are required. 
However, it must analyse changes in its external and internal environment in 
the event decisions need to be revised accordingly.
Appendix 2.6 provides details and examples on the different interven-
tions suggested to convert the six strategies into concrete actions.
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STEP 5
REVIEW RISK DEVELOPMENT 
AND DECISIONS
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
• Risks and opportunities can either be 
decommissioned, or become accepted 
or sufficiently well known for familiar risk 
management measures to be employed.
• Risks and opportunities outside of these 
options must remain the subject of careful and 
continuous monitoring, analysis and revision.
KEY PARTICIPANTS     & RESPONSIBILITIES
Senior managers .......................  review decisions about the organisation’s emerging risk management,  
i.e. the design and implementation of internal structures and processes.
Business managers ................... deploy the adopted risk management strategies.
Emerging risk conductor .......... creates interaction space for reflection and confidence.
• Involvement of all internal stakeholders
• Open and transparent discussions
• Regular updates of strategic decisions based on new information
KEY  
SUCCESS  
FACTORS
REQUIRED ACTIONS
• Deploy monitoring capabilities for the decision options 
described in Step 3.
• Create the interaction space required for the conductor and 
other users of the guidelines to exchange and communicate. 
This will help to gain reflexivity on the strengths and weaknesses 
of the arrangements put in place in the earlier steps.
• Establish bridges with risk management standards or 
professional organisations, which may help confer legitimacy 
on how the emerging risk governance process is applied in 
the organisation.
KEY OBJECTIVE: REVIEW AND UPDATE THE STRATEGY
Step 5 serves to:
• Monitor how emerging risks and opportunities unfold.
• Review the relevance and performance of the decisions made and, if needed.
• Update the strategy.
It must thus:
• Demonstrate whether the organisation is dealing effectively with the opportunities and risks that emerge 
from changing and evolving internal or external contexts.
• Provide valuable information to Steps 1, 2 and 3 of the process.
• Provide insights on the strengths and weaknesses of the guidelines (reflexive process).
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What to do and how
No important emerging risk or opportunity must go unnoticed. The last phase 
of the process will thus review:
• Timeliness: Was the organisation able to identify all emerging risks at an 
early stage?
• Avoidance of loss: To what extent were negative impacts on the 
organisation’s business and reputation avoided?
• Risk mitigation (for each emerging risk identified in Step 1): Was the 
risk eliminated, or was sufficient knowledge developed so that it can be 
managed using frameworks and instruments for familiar, established risks 
(for example standards and norms, regulation, and risk transfer to financial 
or insurance markets)? 
• Competition: How did the organisation deal with the emerging risk in 
comparison to its peers or competitors?
Monitoring the consequences of decisions and reviewing them systemati-
cally is a key element in any governance process. In the case of guidelines 
for emerging risk governance, monitoring and reviewing the management 
process and its outcomes become even more crucial as the guidelines are 
expected to provide the organisation with proactive capabilities. By pursuing 
a pathway of adaptive management, the organisation learns one step at a 
time how to implement decisions and to monitor their intended and unin-
tended consequences.
As new conditions develop or new knowledge is generated, 
most risk management frameworks explicitly state that risk 
management decisions should be reviewed.
The ISO 31000 (2009) principles for risk management, for 
example, state: “Monitoring and review of the framework 
is important to ensure that risk management is effective 
and continues to support organisational performance. 
Organisations should: establish performance measures, 
periodically measure progress against, and deviation from 
the risk management plan, periodically review whether the risk 
management framework, policy and plan are still appropriate 
given the organisations’ internal and external context, report 
on risks, progress with the risk management plan and ensure 
how well the risk management policy is being followed, and 
review the effectiveness of the risk management framework. 
Organisations should also engage in continual improvement 
of the framework. Based on the review, decisions should 
be made on how the risk management framework, policy 
and plan can be improved. These decisions should lead to 
Box 11: Risk decision review process in familiar risk governance
improvements in the organisation’s risk management, and 
risk management culture.”
The IRGC risk governance framework also stresses the 
importance of systematically monitoring the effects of 
decisions once they are implemented: “The monitoring system 
should be designed to assess intended as well as unintended 
consequences. Often a formal policy assessment study is 
issued in order to explore the consequences of a given set 
of risk management measures on different dimensions of 
what people value. In addition to generating feedback for 
the effectiveness of the options taken to reduce the risks, 
the monitoring phase should also provide new information on 
early-warning signals for both new risks and old risks viewed 
from a new perspective. It is advisable to have the institutions 
performing the risk and concern assessments participate in 
monitoring and supervision so that their analytic skills and 
experience can be utilised in evaluating the performance of 
the selected management options” (IRGC, 2005, p. 43).
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Insights gained from the reviewing and monitoring process benefit the or-
ganisation in multiple ways: 
• Decisions that prove to be effective can provide transferable lessons, 
whereas decisions that perform poorly create opportunities for improvement.
• The conductor may rely on an established, routine review process and the 
constant monitoring of decisions.
• Reviews and monitoring can provide valuable input into Step 1 by revising 
the list of signals, and into Step 2 by suggesting when updating the 
scenarios is necessary.
The best way to achieve the objectives is to embed “routine ERG” into the 
organisation’s processes and annual programme. The "corporate calendar" 
provides opportunities for the conductor to provide information on the ERG, 
much in the same way that corporations have annual shareholder meetings 
to review the year’s performance and provide direction for the coming year. 
Just as important as an annual (or more frequent) review opportunity is the 
establishment of a space for internal dialogue on emerging risk. Swiss Re, 
for example, uses SONAR (Systematic Observation of Notions Associated 
with Risks), their in-house mechanism, to gather information employees 
believe is relevant for the identification of emerging risks (see Appendix 1.3).
In practical terms, the emerging risk conductor should organise regular 
reviews to determine how each of the guidelines’ previous phases was 
conducted. These reviews serve to identify whether additional open and 
contextual (Step 1) or targeted (Step 2) foresight exercises are needed and 
to review management decisions (Step 3) and their implementation (Step 4).
Deploying monitoring capabilities
1. What needs to be monitored?
The following two aspects should be monitored in parallel:
• Relevance of the hypotheses and the outcome of Steps 1 and 2 
Do they need to be revised and, if so, must the strategic decisions made 
on their basis be adjusted as well? This initial monitoring focuses on the 
way threats and opportunities are effectively unfolding as opposed to what 
was assumed. It implies monitoring the consequences of the contributing 
factors, tipping points and thresholds identified in the scenarios. Clearly 
identifying the thresholds of, for example, acceptability or irreversibility is 
particularly important for emerging issues.
• Effectiveness of the decisions made in Step 3 
As long as the identified uncertainties and hypotheses formulated in Steps 
1 and 2 remain unchanged, the monitoring should focus on the strategies’ 
ability to perform adequately based on this information.
46 //  IRGC Guidelines for Emerging Risk Governance
2. What does the monitoring involve?
Organisations need to select appropriate metrics and:
• Consider the complexity of the phenomena to be monitored so the metrics 
are not too simplistic.
• Ensure that the metrics are cost effective and adapted to the availability 
of the data.
• Favour leading indicators that provide insights on future evolutions over 
lagging indicators that reflect past behaviours.
3. How must the monitoring output be analysed and communicated?
The knowledge collected through monitoring must be analysed and made 
available to the decision-makers. It is the conductor’s responsibility to en-
sure that Steps 1 and 2 include an updated evaluation of how risks and 
opportunities are actually evolving. On the other hand, the decision-makers 
who decided on the strategy must carefully follow the effectiveness of their 
approaches, preferably by combining different metrics and sources for greater 
reliability.
Engaging in a reflexive process
For the guidelines to be considered legitimate and effective by internal and 
external stakeholders, the conductor must demonstrate their validity and 
update the practices in view of environmental changes and new information. 
Both substantive and procedural validity are required.
Substantive validation is based on evaluating outcomes by comparing them 
with reality in terms of avoided losses (which is only possible ex post). This 
form of validation is not always possible as outcomes may be visible only 
after a long period or may not be visible at all.
Procedural validation is based on assessing the quality of the process that 
led to the outcomes. The scientific validity of the approaches used, regularly 
updated data and hypotheses, and openness and transparency are examples 
of the criteria used for procedural validation.
The conductor can assess the guidelines’ relevance and effectiveness through 
a substantive evaluation based on a number of suggested criteria for each 
of the previous phases. The number of criteria may be restricted depending 
on the organisation’s culture and practices.
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3.
CONDITIONS  
FOR SUCCESS
Even when well designed and structured, management frameworks can fail 
to reach their objectives. Several factors may lie behind this failure, including 
a lack of motivation on the part of staff, poor communication, a reluctance 
to change or the unavailability of resources.
Organisations must provide a supportive environment for the process that 
goes beyond the careful implementation of each of the steps described 
earlier and the availability of technical support. Many of the components of 
such an environment have been discussed already. They include ensuring 
support from the strategic decision-making level, appointing a conductor 
to facilitate the process, and adapting incentives and rewards to encourage 
emerging risk recognition.
3.1 Insights from emerging risk 
management in organisations
While developing the guidelines for ERG described in this report, IRGC inter-
viewed various organisations with experience developing and implementing 
dedicated systems or processes for ERG. These insights highlight additional 
challenges and best practices related to the role of emerging risk conductors:
• The representation of a potential change or threat as a risk to an 
organisation or population may have important strategic consequences.
Often manifest as cognitive biases, organisations may show inertia and 
reluctance to change because of vested (economic or political) interests 
(Hodgkinson, 2012). Counter-incentives and inappropriate or lacking 
incentives may deter middle managers from recognising, report-
ing and addressing new risks. The health impact of asbestos, for 
instance, was suspected for centuries before being formally recog-
nised as a health risk only in the 19th century in the UK. Its use was first 
regulated in the 1970s, amid highly controversial political, economic, legal 
and public considerations. In many areas of risk governance, stakeholders 
attempt to avoid accountability by not seeking credible information on 
emerging risk. For instance, certain food manufacturers in the US have 
opposed National Institute of Health funding for research on the adverse 
48 //  IRGC Guidelines for Emerging Risk Governance
effects of trans fats (a type of unsaturated fat used for frying or as an 
ingredient in processed foods that can lead to high cholesterol levels).
Keen political, societal and media interest in high profile issues can serious-
ly deter decision-makers from framing certain issues as risks. Conversely, 
some emerging risks begin to draw attention only when they are framed 
as public challenges (Borraz, 2007). Risk governance does not happen 
in a vacuum; it is not neutral. It represents problems in ways that may 
privilege particular views and therefore prioritise certain decisions based 
on subjective criteria.
• Innovation management and emerging risk management are 
interlinked, even in the public sector. 
Innovation management is an important activity in industry to develop 
opportunities from new technologies. ERG can also be used to identify 
latent or future opportunities that may become competitive advantages 
for organisations. For example, in internal processes for emerging risk 
management developed by insurance companies, specific attention is 
given to business opportunities arising from new risks (see Appendices 
1.3 and 2.2).
In their role as facilitators of technological innovation, governments must 
consider the significant social and cultural impacts of new technologies 
(revealed by social science research) before deciding how, if and when 
to take one forward (despite the fact that it could generate new risks), or 
what controls to put in place. Broader deliberation with stakeholders in the 
public sector can be coordinated by the emerging risk conductor.
• An ERG process needs to demonstrate that it is effective and worth 
the investment.
Like any process, ERG must provide a tangible output that is of value 
to the organisation. Quantitative frameworks, especially those based on 
or providing monetary value, for instance by assessing the relevance of 
risk governance strategies or policies, are of limited use in the case of 
emerging risk, because of high uncertainties and the lack of quantitative 
data. Furthermore, the benefits of emerging risk management processes 
may not be apparent before a long lapse of time as the time horizons 
considered may be over several years. Finally, the processes’ outputs are 
only one of several aspects considered by decision-makers, making it 
difficult to trace back their merits and limits. Overall, engaging in ERG is 
expected to contribute to creating an internal risk culture appropriate for 
strategic planning and adaptation to change, as outlined in the introduction.
• People in charge of identifying and assessing emerging risks must 
continuously communicate with decision-makers and risk owners.
Integrating an identified threat in the risk portfolio is the outcome of an 
iterative and gradual process during which, under the responsibility of the 
emerging risk conductor, decision-makers progressively become familiar 
with the potential new risk, until they identify it formally as an emerging risk 
with which the organisation must deal, using formal response strategies.
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• The emerging risk conductor must not be a “prophet of doom”.
The emerging risk conductor can communicate good news in various 
ways. First, he/she can stress the fact that the process can also help to 
identify emerging opportunities that may develop as a result of new con-
ditions or new technologies. The Kodak example and the development of 
digital technology in photography illustrates this well (see Box 2). Another 
way for the emerging risk conductor to convey a positive message is to 
announce when an emerging risk has been taken off the list of potential 
risks to the organisation (or “decommissioned”), following the successful 
deployment of the process. Finally, a positive message may simply con-
sist in communicating the results of careful scientific examination. This 
can contribute to de-emphasising and objectivising the political or public 
controversies surrounding so-called “problems” backed by limited or weak 
scientific evidence. Social science research and monitoring can help to 
identify concerns and potential conflicts ahead of their actual occurrence.
In addition to these lessons from experience, organisations should also 
consider the following complementary crosscutting requirements: commu-
nication, tolerance to failure, understanding cognitive aspects and the need 
for leadership and trust.
3.2 Communication
As seen in Step 4, internal and external communication is central to the 
success of strategy implementation. At a broader level, the role of commu-
nication is to:
• Support ERG by creating the required interactions between stakeholders, 
within or outside the organisation.
• Foster a dialogue about the challenge of investing in emerging risk 
identification and response measures, despite uncertainty about the actual 
impact and extent of negative consequences to the organisation. The 
frequently adopted wait-and-see attitude and the tendency to give priority 
to current risks while neglecting future threats are important barriers to 
overcome.
• Familiarise decision-makers with the characteristics of emerging risks and 
with existing strategies to deal with them, for example by illustrating cases 
of successful emerging risk management.
• Ease the process of continuously reshaping organisational resources and 
objectives, especially with regard to possible internal resistance.
3.3. Tolerance for failure
The concept of tolerance for failure refers to the culture in an organisation 
that allows limited leeway for trial and error. This is often recognised as a 
feature of organisations that adopt a proactive attitude to change, “learning 
by doing”, and for which it is important not to blame those who try to improve 
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how things are done, even when they do not succeed. Although tolerance 
for failure may be hard to apply in some public or politicised agencies or in 
private sector companies judged on their financial performance, the obstacles 
can be overcome. Providing free spaces for trial and error learning, when the 
errors are still manageable and can be contained in time and space is impor-
tant. If the errors thus surfaced challenge the existence of the organisation or 
threaten its functionality, the learning process must be shifted into the virtual 
space where simulations can help to provide learning opportunities without 
risking fatal errors in the real world.
To illustrate, adopting the funnel-type process described in Step 2 allows 
dealing with uncertainties and complexities involved in emerging risk identifi-
cation and assessment, and avoiding the risk of failing to identify an emerging 
risk or not stopping the exploration and assessment of an emerging risk if 
it is not relevant to the organisation. Funnel-type processes are designed 
to find the best compromise between focusing on the most relevant factors 
and being open to new and even unexpected developments and events. By 
filtering information and input, it is possible to focus on a limited number of 
issues, without losing one’s sensitivity to complex risk interactions. 
Experiences in innovation management in particular show that these types 
of processes generate “waste”, i.e. ideas that turn out to be irrelevant for the 
organisation, before they are seen as management failures. It is very likely that 
comparable waste generation will be experienced in ERG, and this must be 
tolerated. It is the conductor’s responsibility to ensure that emerging threats 
not relevant to an organisation are identified as early as possible to minimise 
resource consumption or reputational damage.
3.4. Understanding cognitive aspects
Emerging risk governance is not only challenging at the organisational level, 
it may also question cognitive patterns underlying individual decisions and 
behaviours. Exploring and analysing a large set of uncertain and weak 
signals, going beyond the behaviours of past systems to imagine their future, 
organising the collection of multi-disciplinary knowledge, and deciding on 
risks and opportunities that have not yet materialised is a very demanding 
and often challenging exercise. Potentially powerful cognitive biases need 
to be overcome. Cognitive biases, such as the tendency to systematically 
underestimate surprises, to assume that lessons have been learned from the 
past or to overestimate the ability to make judgments under unpredictable 
circumstances, can reinforce this propensity. In addition, problems of 
collective judgment, such as group biases towards cautious or risky shifts, 
need to be considered. Faced with a choice between a “safe” and “risky” 
decision, group members appear to lean towards one extreme or the other, 
relative to the choices each member might have made on their own (Davis & 
Hinsz, 1982). Both risky and cautious shifts, a phenomenon known as “group 
polarization”, have been identified in the literature.
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Careful attention should be paid to ensuring that:
• The conductor and his/her team are trained appropriately and their 
interventions are adequately framed to reduce biases and the attendant 
impact of employee morale. Hodgkinson and Healey’s (2011, 2014) analysis 
of psychological issues related to the development of dynamic capabilities 
in organisations provides relevant insights.
• Participants in the process, including decision-makers at various levels of 
the organisation, avoid conservatism and think outside the box. Particular 
consideration should go into ensuring that rewards and incentives are put 
in place and that the behaviour of individuals implicated in the process is 
steered in the same direction.
• Professional support and external reviews are encouraged to provide the 
process with challenging outside views and complementary expertise. As 
already mentioned in this report, IRGC suggests relying on professional 
experts in futures studies to facilitate scenario development.
Biases and intuitive heuristics also relate to processing information on risk 
aspects, such as exposure, probability or uncertainty. Table 1 provides an 
overview of common biases that individuals often apply to judge risks or to 
draw inferences from probabilistic information (Festinger, 1957; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2011; Renn, 2008).
3.5. Authority and trust
Emerging risks develop in contexts often marked by uncertainty and socio- 
economic instability. They can represent threats to economic well-being, 
the provision of critical services or even moral values such as privacy. This 
goes hand-in-hand with growing distrust in existing institutions, be they 
governments or large corporations. In consequence, organisations should 
pay close attention to restoring, building and maintaining trust. Rather than 
spending resources on conventional risk management methods, such as 
command-and-control regulatory measures, the emerging risk conductor and 
leaders in ERG should establish their legitimacy and credibility by proving 
effective outcomes relying on skills like adaptability, flexibility and creativity.
Table 1: Intuitive biases of risk 
perception
Availability Events that come to people’s mind immediately (e.g. events highlighted in the mass 
media) are rated as more probable than events that are less in their thoughts
Anchoring effect Probabilities are not adjusted sufficiently to the new information available, being 
anchored to the perceived significance of the initial information
Representativeness Single events experienced by people or associated with properties of an event thus 
experienced are considered more typical than information based on the actual fre-
quencies of those events
Avoidance of 
cognitive dissonance
Information that challenges perceived probabilities that are already part of a belief 
system will either be ignored or minimised, in an attempt to attenuate cognitive 
dissonance.
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Fostering inter-disciplinarity and multi-sectorial risk 
management
• Effective inclusion of stakeholders in the assessment and 
decision-making process
• Integration of the various risks as well as the elements that 
compose the risks
Establishing an appropriate risk culture
• Development of transparency in government objectives and 
of means to deal with uncertainty and emerging issues
• Provision of convincing methods and procedures to 
evaluate threats and to design options to deal with them
• Agility, innovation and creativity to ensure flexibility and 
adaptability
• Communication to build constructive discussions about 
risks
Box 12: IRGC hallmarks and drivers of effective emerging risk governance
Assigning risk ownership (“home”) for emerging issues
• Need to ascertain accountability
• Need to prioritise issues among the many uncertainties, 
potential opportunities and threats
Determining the appropriate timing to act
• Intervention points and timely action
In 2010, IRGC worked with a number of governments to identify hallmarks 
and drivers of effective emerging risk governance (IRGC, 2011). Success 
factors are listed in Box 12.
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4.
CONCLUSION
Elaborating upon previous work on the contributing 
factors to risk emergence and on improving the manage- 
ment of emerging risk, the Guidelines for Emerging Risk 
Governance presented in this report aim to support 
public and private organisations in dealing proactively 
with emerging risks. Designing the appropriate internal 
processes involves the ability to anticipate risk (identify, 
evaluate and prioritise potential threats and opportunities) 
and respond to risk (assess and respond to those threats 
that may develop into risks to the organisation).
Figure 9: Emerging risk governance at the intersection of 
various disciplines and theoretical frameworks
Emerging risks tend to develop in complex environments 
and display high levels of uncertainty. Applying conven-
tional measurement logics is inadequate to address 
emerging risks and, therefore, frameworks for the gover- 
nance of familiar risks are often not fully appropriate in 
these contexts. Furthermore, emerging risks and opportu- 
nities are often interrelated, making it equally important 
for organisations to create conditions for opportuni-
ty management as well as for risk management. This 
improves their capacity to adapt to changing environ-
ments as well as their competitive advantage. Ultimately, 
ERG aims to avoid major failures (for example “the next 
asbestos”) and protect public well-being.
As governing emerging risks is at the intersection of var-
ious disciplines and theoretical frameworks, IRGC has 
integrated expertise from various fields, including risk 
management, futures studies, innovation management, 
dynamic capabilities and strategic decision-making.
IRGC will engage in further discussions on the relevance 
and application of the guidelines by various types of 
organisations, to continue to refine the process.
Emerging risk
governance
Futures sudies
Decision-
making under
deep 
uncertainty
Strategy
implementation
Risk
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Innovation
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Complexity: The difficulty of identifying and quantifying 
causal links between a multitude of potential causal agents 
and specific observed effects (IRGC, 2005).
Complex system: A system composed of many parts that 
interact with and adapt to each other (OECD, 2009).
Emerging risk: A new risk, or a familiar risk in a new or 
unfamiliar context (re-emerging). These risks may also be 
rapidly changing (in nature). Although they may be perceived 
as potentially significant, at least by some stakeholders or 
decision-makers, their probabilities and consequences are 
not widely understood or appreciated (IRGC, 2010a).
Familiarity: Knowledge and experience with an organism, 
the intended application or activity and the potential receiving 
environment. A relatively low degree of familiarity may be 
compensated for by appropriate management practices. 
Familiarity can be increased as a result of trial or experiment. 
This increased familiarity can then form a basis for future risk 
assessment (UNEP, 1995).
Precautionary approaches: The 1992 Rio Conference on the 
Environment and Development adopted the Rio Declaration, 
whose Principle 15 states that: “In order to protect the envi-
ronment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capability. Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation”.
Risk: An uncertain negative consequence of an event or an 
activity with regard to something that humans value (definition 
originally in Kates, et al., 1985, p. 21).
Risk appetite: The amount and type of risk that an organ-
isation is prepared to pursue, retain or take (ISO 73, 2009).
Risk assessment: The task of identifying and exploring, prefera-
bly in quantified terms, the types, intensities and likelihood of the 
(normally undesired) consequences related to a risk. Risk assess-
ment comprises hazard identification and estimation, exposure 
and vulnerability assessment, and risk estimation (IRGC, 2005).
GLOSSARY
Risk governance: The identification, assessment, man-
agement and communication of risks in a broad context. It 
includes the totality of actors, rules, conventions, processes 
and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk information 
is collected, analysed and communicated, and how and by 
whom management decisions are taken (IRGC, 2005).
Risk management: The creation and evaluation of options for 
initiating or changing human activities or (natural or artificial) 
structures with the objective of increasing the net benefit to 
human society and preventing harm to humans and what 
they value; and the implementation of chosen options and 
the monitoring of their effectiveness (IRGC, 2005).
Risk profile: In the case of a single risk, a profile capturing 
several dimensions, qualitative and quantitative, that describe 
the risk in ways useful to a risk manager who is making initial 
decisions about what should be done. A profile may also 
describe a set of risks of concern to an organisation.
Risk tolerance: An organisation’s or stakeholder’s readiness 
to bear the risk after risk treatment (process to modify the risk) 
in order to achieve its objectives. (Note: Risk tolerance can be 
influenced by legal or regulatory requirements) (ISO 73, 2009).
Systemic risks: Risks affecting the systems on which society 
depends. The term “systemic” was assigned to risk by the 
OECD in 2003 and denotes the embeddedness of any risk to 
human health and the environment in a larger context of social, 
financial and economic consequences and increased inter-
dependencies both across risks and between their various 
backgrounds (IRGC, 2005). Systemic risks are characterised 
by complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. Most often, they 
are also trans-boundary.
Uncertainty: A state of knowledge in which the likelihood 
of any effect, or the effects themselves, cannot be precisely 
described. (Note: This is different from ignorance about the 
effects or their likelihood.) (IRGC, 2005).
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